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Abstract: 
Whether online intermediaries should be held responsible for user-uploaded content is one of 
the earliest conundrums of Internet law. Since the 1990s, the prevailing model has been to ex-
empt online intermediaries from liability for third-party infringements as long as they conform 
to certain conditions. Recently, calls to expand intermediary liability has intensified both in the 
U.S. and the EU. Adversaries of the safe harbor regulation claim that the current laws have gone 
too far and favor intermediaries unfairly. 
The aim of the thesis is to analyze the validity of the calls to abolish safe harbors. The 
intent is to do so by investigating how the safe harbors work, why they exist, how they will 
develop in the future, and what to consider if the procedures were to be changed. The methods 
chosen are doctrinal research and comparative analysis. The reason for using both methods is 
that it will provide a deeper understanding of why safe harbors exist and additional arguments 
for the analysis. I have chosen to compare the U.S. and the EU intermediary liability regimes 
because of the vast amount of information available, their close historical ties, and the relevance 
of respective markets. 
The question of whether intermediary liability safe harbors should exist or not boils 
down to which fundamental rights the legislators want to emphasize and protect. All of the in-
volved parties have their own set of competing interests and any decision is going to favor 
someone. There are three ways to go about changing how intermediary liability works. The first 
option is to provide intermediaries complete insulation from liability, the second option is to 
introduce safe harbors that are conditional or to adjust existing conditions, and the third option 
is to introduce strict liability to intermediaries. The first two options already exist in the U.S. 
and are proven to work. The procedures are not flawless, but at least they conform to fundamen-
tal rights fairly well. Introducing strict liability to intermediaries would more than likely lead to 
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Whether online intermediaries should be held responsible for third-party content is one of the 
earliest conundrums of Internet law.1 Two U.S cases in the early 1990s with paradoxical out-
comes made it apparent that the issue needed to be addressed sooner rather than later. The pre-
vailing model ever since, has been that online intermediaries are exempt from liability for third-
party content as long as they act as passive distributors.2 If the online intermediary is involved 
in creating the content, it will generally be considered a publisher and thus will not qualify for 
the safe harbors. The safe harbors were first introduced in the U.S. and soon after the EU fol-
lowed suit.3 However, there are a few significant differences between the U.S. and the EU safe 
harbor schemes which will be analyzed in this thesis. 
Recently, the debate about increased intermediary liability has intensified both in the U.S. and 
the EU.4 The calls to repeal existing safe harbors seems to emanate from a variety of entities 
with distinct incentives. The general belief among adversaries of the safe harbor regulation, is 
that current laws have gone too far and favor intermediaries unfairly.5 Perhaps, the most fervent 
opponents of the safe harbor policies are copyright holders that argue for the existence of a 
“value gap”.6 The controversial concept of value gap, refers to an alleged imbalance between 
how much online intermediaries are making on user-uploaded content compared to the 
rightsholders.7 According to the theory, rightsholders are forced to accept low royalty rates be-
cause online intermediaries can otherwise simply turn down license deals and exploit the pro-
tection provided by the safe harbors.8  
The other key argument for increased intermediary liability is tackling “hate speech” and “fake 
news” (misinformation). The expression “hate speech” is ambiguous to say the least, but 
 
1 Edwards 2019, p. 255. 
2 Savin 2017, p. 144. 
3 Frosio 2017a, p. 24. 
4 Savin 2017, p. 144. 
5 Elkin-Koren et al. 2019, p. 9. 
6 Obergfell – Thamer 2017, p. 435. 
7 Rosati 2019, p. 200–201. 
8 Elkin-Koren et al. 2019, p. 4. 
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essentially, the increasingly aware Internet culture is pushing for restrictions on “public speech 
that expresses hate or encourages violence toward a person or group based on something such 
as race, religion, sex, or sexual orientation”.9 Misinformation on the Internet became a hot topic 
during Donald Trump’s presidency due to his active use of Twitter for expressing thoughts. 
Especially in the U.S., the concern has been that misinformation would affect, among other 
things, political elections, and people’s perception of vaccines and COVID-19.  
Clearly, the power balance between the different parties involved has shifted dramatically since 
the creation of the safe harbors. The user volumes have increased exponentially, giving online 
intermediaries unprecedented power and influence.10 Whereas the early legislation on online 
intermediary liability was intended to stimulate the growth of electronic commerce, the debate 
has nowadays turned upside down. The current concern is that the platforms are becoming too 
powerful, and governments are trying to find ways of controlling them. By 2015, the largest 
listed online platforms had a market capitalization of USD 3.9 trillion and the number has only 
grown since then.11 Online intermediaries have an essential role in enabling the flow of infor-
mation and consequently protecting, among other things, freedom of expression which is a fun-
damental right guaranteed by law in most of the world, including the U.S. and the EU.12 This 
puts them in a unique position where they can prevent or mitigate damage inflicted by their 
users, which is ultimately the main reason why there are calls to increase their liability.13 
The growing power of online platforms is not only a national concern, but also a global concern 
due to their transborder influence.14 However, it also works the other way around; the online 
intermediaries have to abide by the laws of each jurisdiction they operate in.15 It appears to be 
in the interest of all relevant parties to find a working solution to the online intermediary liability 
 
9 Cambridge Dictionary “hate speech” definition. Retrieved April 11, 2021, from https://dictionary.cam-
bridge.org/us/dictionary/english/hate-speech 
10 Edwards 2019, p. 256. 
11 European Commission, Staff Working Document Online Platforms, SWD (2016) 172, p. 1. 
12 Geiger et al. 2020, p. 140; U.S. Const. amend. I; Article 10 ECHR; Article 11 EU Charter. Freedom of expression 
not only guarantees the right to impart information but also the right of the public to receive it. With the increased 
importance of the Internet as a source of information and a means to express thoughts, the freedom of expression 
has in the recent years evolved towards a right to internet access. 
13 Savin 2017, p. 143. 
14 Elkin-Koren et al. 2019, p. 14. 
15 Frosio 2017a, p. 17. 
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issue. What is indisputable is that liability of online intermediaries is currently hotly debated, 
and it deserves further examining.16           
1.2 Objective and Scope 
The calls to repeal the online intermediary safe harbors in the U.S. and the EU have intensified 
during recent years. The purpose of this thesis is to analyze the validity of such demands. This 
will be accomplished through a multistep process. Firstly, I will investigate how the online in-
termediary safe harbors work and why they exist in the U.S. and in the EU. In order to answer 
the question whether they should be repealed or not, I believe the most sensible approach is to 
first understand how the safe harbors work and why they were enacted in the first place. Sec-
ondly, I will examine why the safe harbors differ from each other. Given that they are dissimilar, 
there must be advantages and disadvantages to one system over another. Thus, the intent is to 
identify and compare those differences. In the end, I will compile and analyze the arguments for 
and against, isolating intermediaries from liability from a universal perspective. Additionally, I 
will evaluate a few key features of the safe harbor policies with the intention of distinguishing 
which aspects of them work and which could be improved upon. In conclusion, the objective is 
to provide insight concerning how the safe harbors work, why they exist, how they will develop 
in the future, and what to be mindful of if the procedures were to be changed. 
In a study with a wide subject matter such as this, it is essential to make pragmatic delimitations. 
The territorial delimitation is the first dilemma. Online intermediary liability is an area of law 
which is harmonized within the EU, meaning that the legislation in its member states is based 
on Union law. The research will thus be focused on EU legislation rather than national legisla-
tion of the member states. In order to understand why the safe harbors were created in the EU, 
it is necessary to also examine U.S. legislation. Not only does the U.S. legislation provide an-
swers as to why the EU adopted safe harbor regulation, it also provides a rich history of relevant 
case law as well as written law, which serves superbly for a comparative analysis. Furthermore, 
the U.S. is home to a majority of the world’s largest online intermediaries rendering it an inter-
esting and relevant market to study. 
 
16 Hartmann-Vareilles 2017, p. 3. 
4 
 
The second delimitation concerns which statutes will be examined. Both the U.S. and the EU 
are brimming with legislation. In order to keep the research on track, it is necessary to choose a 
few relevant statutes to examine. Intermediary liability touches on countless areas of law and it 
is unquestionably impossible to cover all of them in this thesis. I decided to start with the Elec-
tronic Commerce Directive (ECD)17, which is historically the main piece of legislation on online 
intermediary liability in the EU. It was found that the comparable legislation in the U.S.  is split 
into two separate laws, Section 23018 and the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA)19. 
Essentially, the DMCA regulates copyright infringements and Section 230 regulates the rest, 
whereas in the EU, the ECD regulates all of it. By this logic, I established the three core statutes 
I would work with. Nonetheless, the EU is in the process of creating and implementing a sub-
stantial quantity of new legislation which cannot be completely disregarded. Above all, there 
has been a lot of debate about the recent Directive on Copyright in the Digital Single Market 
(DSMD)20. By the time of writing this, the directive has come into force, but it has not yet been 
implemented by the member states. With that in mind, I will cover what the DSMD means for 
European online intermediary liability, to the extent it is relevant for my research questions. 
There is also new legislation on the horizon that is noteworthy. The European Commission sub-
mitted a legislative proposal with the title “Digital Services Act” (DSA) to the European Parlia-
ment and the European Council on December 15, 2020.21 The DSA will only be touched upon 
briefly due to how early in the process the law currently is and the uncertainty of its final form 
if it passes. It cannot be emphasized enough that the legislation I chose to analyze does not cover 
all of the intermediary liability legislation. It is simply a pragmatic delimitation that hopefully 
yields valuable viewpoints on the topic of online intermediary liability. 
Lastly, I had to consider what kind of infringements that are best to include in the research. I 
decided not to delimit the research to any specific infringements, instead the focus is on online 
intermediary liability for all third-party infringements. The decision was ultimately relatively 
straightforward since the ECD plays a central role in my research, and unlike its U.S. 
 
17 Directive 2000/31/EC. 
18 47 U.S. Code § 230. 
19 Pub.L. 105-304 -- October 28, 1998 -- To amend title 17, United States Code, to implement the World Intellectual 
Property Organization Copyright Treaty and Performances and Phonograms Treaty, and for other purposes. 
20 Directive 2019/790 
21 Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on a Single Market For Digital Services 
(Digital Services Act) and amending Directive 2000/31/EC 
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counterparts, the ECD does not only apply to certain specific infringements. Not to delimit 
online intermediary liability research to specific infringement also seems to be the standard 
among scholars. Such delimitation would be arbitrary, unless the research had a more specific 
focus, which it does not.         
1.3 Research Methods and Material  
In the previous chapter I explained largely the method I intend to utilize in this thesis. Nonethe-
less, I will further elaborate on my choice of research method. As my research methods, I will 
be using doctrinal research and comparative analysis. Considering the research questions, nei-
ther method would give a satisfactory result on their own. Instead, I will be analyzing each legal 
system separately through the doctrinal research method, and finally, in the analysis chapter, I 
will conduct text-by-text comparative analysis and combine it with some de lege ferenda argu-
ments.  
The purpose of the doctrinal research method is to give a systematic exposition of the principles, 
rules and concepts governing online intermediary liability and to analyze the relationship be-
tween them with a view to solving ambiguities and gaps in the existing law.22 Especially ratio 
legis will be of interest, considering the research questions. Understanding the reasons for the 
law, will undoubtedly provide arguments for the analysis. The first goal is to describe the exist-
ing law, in order to lay a solid foundation of understanding.23 The method also encompasses a 
search for practical solutions.24 This will be accomplished through the use of conventional ma-
terial such as articles, books, reports, case law, statutes etc. The rich use of case law, especially 
the older case law, can be explained by the interest in ratio legis. Court decisions are usually 
ample in reasoning and are thus a valuable asset for the research. For the analysis, I will utilize 
plenty of legal literature by scholars, since standing on the shoulders of giants is essential for 
thorough research. To add another layer of depth, I will juxtapose the safe harbor policies with 
each other, which will hopefully yield additional arguments for the conclusion. The comparative 
method can present a new perspective, allowing to critically illumine the compared legal 
 
22 Watkins – Burton 2017, p. 13; Smits 2015, p. 5. 
23 Smits 2015, p. 8. 
24 Id.at p. 10. 
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systems.25 Since the research is intended to examine both the U.S. and the EU safe harbors in 
depth, it is reasonable to talk about comparative analysis, rather than utilizing foreign legislation 
for the sake of arguments.26   
1.4 Terminology 
The subject of online intermediary liability encompasses a plethora of ambiguous terminology. 
The most significant bewilderment pertains to the vast number of synonyms, or near synonyms, 
that the word “intermediary” has. Interactive computer service, information content provider, 
online service provider, internet service provider, online platform, user-generated content plat-
form, information society service, online content-sharing service provider, intermediary, dis-
tributor, and publisher are only a few examples of the seemingly endless number of synonyms. 
Some of the words mean more or less exactly the same, some are hypernyms, and some have 
crucial nuance differences. The intention is to keep the text as reader-friendly as possible, mean-
ing that I aim to be as consistent as possible with the choice of terminology. Exceptions will be 
made in quotations or if it is otherwise necessary.   
The other problem is how to define those words.27 The fact is, that a uniform definition of online 
intermediary does not exist, as there is no consensus among professionals or legislators, as to 
what such definition should include.28 Each statute that attempts to define one of those syno-
nyms, have different definitions. The use of those words is not uniform even within the U.S. or 
the EU. Part of the reason why there is no agreement about what exactly those words mean, is 
that it would have considerable legal implications. If the law dictates that publishers are liable 
for third-party infringements, but distributors are not, then the definition of publisher and dis-





25 Legrand 1995, p. 13. 
26 Strömholm 1971, p. 252. 
27 See Bostoen 2018, p. 3. 
28 Rozenfeldova – Sokol 2019, p. 868.  
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2 Intermediary Liability in the U.S. 
2.1 Early Development towards Intermediaries’ Insulation from Liability 
The early case law certainly predates the online era. However, even the safe harbor policy that 
we have today stems from the early cases. The focus has shifted over time from television and 
radio broadcasters to online intermediaries, but the legal reasoning has largely remained the 
same. Intermediary liability was not regulated by the EU prior to the year 2000, by which most 
countries in the EU had little to no legislation or case law pertaining to it. The U.S. on the other 
hand, has for more than a half century recognized by decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court, that 
intermediaries have some degree of insulation from liability.29 None of the present-day legisla-
tion was invented overnight, instead it has been an extensive process to develop the safe harbor 
policy that we have today. In order to understand why safe harbor policies exist today, it is 
necessary to begin by looking back to a couple cases regarding a local broadcasting station and 
a bookstore in the 1950s in the U.S.  
2.1.1 First Amendment Concerns 
The 1956 U.S Senate race in North Dakota appeared to be a regular Senate race with the two 
top candidates being Republican Milton Young and Democrat Quentin Burdick. However, a 
week before the election, Arthur C. Townley, a legally qualified independent candidate, gave 
an inflammatory speech broadcasted by the radio and television station WDAY. Townley was 
a former socialist organizer that had founded the Nonpartisan League, a political party that ad-
vocated for the government to take over agricultural businesses. He was infamous throughout 
the state for his contentious rhetoric. After numerous unsuccessful political campaigns and busi-
ness efforts Townley eventually denounced socialism and took a strong stance against com-
munism in the 1950s, while targeting the leaders of the Farmers Union. Townley became a 
fervent follower of the Senator Joseph McCarthy who claimed that communists worked for the 
federal government.30 
 
29 Kosseff 2019, p. 10. 
30 See Arthur C. Townley, Encyclopedia of the Great Plains. Retrieved January 13, 2021, from http://plainshuman-
ities.unl.edu/encyclopedia/doc/egp.pd.052; Section 2: Origins of the nonpartisan league, North Dakota Official 
State Website. Retrieved January 15, 2021, from https://www.ndstudies.gov/gr8/content/unit-iii-waves-
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During the 1956 U.S Senate race in North Dakota, WDAY had broadcast speeches by both 
Young and Burdick. Townley claimed that WDAY should provide him with the same oppor-
tunity that the other candidates had been granted, to broadcast his speech. Pursuant to section 
315 of the federal Communications Act of 1934, any broadcaster that allows a candidate to 
broadcast a message “shall afford equal opportunities to all other such candidates” for the office. 
The law also mandates that the broadcaster “shall have no power of censorship” regarding the 
things they air under the equal time requirement.31 WDAY believed that § 315 of the Federal 
Communications Act of 1934 barred them from removing defamatory statements contained in 
speeches broadcast by legally qualified candidates for public office, thus they broadcast Town-
ley’s speech.   
Townley’s speech was a reply to previous speeches made by Senate candidates Young and Bur-
dick. WDAY’s managers realized that Townley’s speech would be divisive, and they even 
warned Townley that his speech might be defamatory if he could not prove his claims to be 
true.32 Townley’s speech accused Young, Burdick and the Farmers Educational and Cooperative 
Union of America of conspiring to establish “a Communist Farmers Union Soviet.” Here is an 
evocative quote from Townley’s speech: 
“For ten years, Senator Young has used the power and prestige of the high office that he 
holds to serve this Farmers Union. He has not raised his voice or hand to stay the com-
munist viper gnawing at your private ownership and liberty. On the contrary, Young 
says everything and does everything the Farmers Union tell him to do or say”.33 
Young went on to win reelection with more than 60 percent of the vote, while Townley received 
less than half a percent of the vote.34 Despite Townley’s lack of success in the election, his 
speech attracted some attention. Shortly after the election, the North Dakota Division of the 
Farmers Education and Cooperative Union of America filed a defamation lawsuit against not 
only Townley, but also WDAY for broadcasting the speech. The union sought $150,000 from 
 
development-1861-1920/lesson-4-alliances-and-conflicts/topic-7-nonpartisan-league-and-iva/section-2-origins-
nonpartisan-league; Kosseff 2019, p. 12. 
31 Farmers Educ. & Co-op. Union v. WDAY, Inc., 360 U.S. 525 (1959). 
32 Kosseff 2019, p. 12. 
33 Complaint, Farmers Educational and Cooperative Union of America, North Dakota Division v. Townley, District 
Court of Cass County, North Dakota (Jan. 14, 1957). 




both Townley and WDAY, arguing that by broadcasting the speech and allowing Townley to 
use their facilities, WDAY was equally liable for harm to the union’s reputation.35 
Both the District Court of Cass County, North Dakota and the Supreme Court of North Dakota 
dismissed the claims against WDAY. Judge John C. Pollock of the District Court of Cass County 
argued that WDAY’s participation was limited to “the mechanical preparation, taping, and re-
cording of the script and film” because federal statute required WDAY to broadcast Townley’s 
speech without censoring it in any way.36 The union appealed to the Supreme Court of North 
Dakota, which affirmed the trial court’s dismissal with comparable arguments. J. Lee Ranking, 
who was the U.S. solicitor general at the time, urged the U.S. Supreme Court to hear the case in 
order for the court to adopt the government’s position regarding the federal communications 
law. The U.S. Supreme Court agreed to review the North Dakota court’s ruling. 37 
The question that the U.S. Supreme Court had to resolve was whether the Federal Communica-
tions Act of 1934 prohibits a broadcasting station from removing defamatory statements in 
speeches given by legally qualified candidates for office or not. If so, does the station have 
federal immunity from liability for defamatory statements in the broadcast?38 
One of the most debated topics of the oral arguments was the role and nature of broadcasters 
versus printed media. At one point during the oral arguments, Justice Felix Frankfurter asked 
Douglas A. Anello, a representative of the National Association of Broadcasters, if newspapers 
had to put in any ads that they were offered. “It does not sir and that brings us to my second 
point. Petitioner would equate us with newspapers insofar as they say that newspapers are held 
liable without fault, but it is one thing sir to argue liability without fault, but quite another to 
argue liability without control. Newspapers may print what they please, they may excise, they 
may edit. They have no regulatory body to whom they must account every three years, nor any 
Section 315 telling them what they may or may not do.”, Anello replied to Judge Frankfurter. 
 
35 Complaint, Farmers Educational and Cooperative Union of America, North Dakota Division v. Townley, District 
Court of Cass County, North Dakota (Jan. 14, 1957); Kosseff 2019, p. 13. 
36 Demurrer, Farmers Educational and Cooperative union of America, North Dakota Division v. Townley, District 
Court of Cass County, North Dakota (May. 23, 1957); Farmers Educational and Cooperative Union of America, 
North Dakota Division v. WDAY, 89 NW 2d 102, 110 (N.D. 1958).   
37 Kosseff 2019, p. 14. 
38 Farmers Educational & Cooperative Union of America v. WDAY, Inc. (n.d.). Oyez. Retrieved January 3, 2021, 
from https://www.oyez.org/cases/1958/248  
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The defendants were keen on driving home the point of broadcasters lacking the same kind of 
editorial control that newspapers have.39 
Three months after the oral argument, Justice Hugo L. Black, an adamant defender of the First 
Amendment delivered the opinion of the 5-4 majority. The Court held that the Federal Commu-
nications Act of 1934 prohibited any censorship of political speeches that were mandated by the 
federal equal time rule, effectively immunizing broadcasting stations from any lawsuits stem-
ming from those speeches. Allowing broadcasting stations to censor the content of the speech 
would quite clearly undermine the purpose of the Act, as the Act mandates that “licensee40 shall 
have no power of censorship over the material broadcast”.41 The Act does not explicitly grant 
the broadcasting station immunity, but since they are not allowed to censor the speech in any 
way it is not reasonable for them to be liable for defamatory statements made in the speech. 
Furthermore, the Federal Communications Commission, the body in charge of administering 
the Act, has since 1948 continuously held that licensees cannot remove allegedly libelous matter 
from speeches by candidates. “The legislative history of the measure, both prior to its first en-
actment in 1927 and subsequently, shows a deep hostility to censorship either by the Commis-
sion or by a licensee.”, Justice Black concluded in the majority opinion.42     
The dissenting Justices, led by Felix Frankfurter, argued that the Communications Act of 1934 
was intended to bar only federal, and not state libel prosecutions. “If § 315 could be construed 
to contain implicitly, between the lines, a grant by Congress of immunity from state libel laws, 
the Court's result would follow. But it is not possible to find such implied grant of immunity. It 
is common ground that an express provision granting such immunity was excised from the bill 
which later became the Radio Act of 1927 and repeated attempts in later revisions of the Act to 
introduce similar provisions have failed.”, wrote Frankfurter in the opinion.43 Justice Frankfurter 
approached the case from an entirely different angle than Justice Black. Justice Black focused 
on the freedom of speech and reasonable treatment of the broadcaster. By contrast, Justice 
Frankfurter was more focused on what the congress had intended when drafting the law. Justice 
 
39 Farmers Educational Transcript. Retrieved January 3, 2021, from https://www.oyez.org/cases/1958/248  
40 Licensee refers to the broadcasting station in this context. 
41 Farmers Educ. & Co-op. Union v. WDAY, Inc., 360 U.S. 525 (1959) at 526. 
42 Id. at 528. 
43 Id. at 536. 
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Frankfurter further argued that precedent set by the Court supports the view that the state laws 
stand, unless federal laws explicitly intercede.44        
The Farmers Educational & Cooperative Union of America v. WDAY, Inc. ruling marks the 
U.S. Supreme Court’s first clear recognition of the need to protect intermediaries in addition to 
the speakers. The majority opinion does not explicitly mention the First Amendment, but it is 
an unambiguous statement that the freedom of speech needs to be protected and consequently, 
so do intermediaries. The ruling provides two significant clarifications for interpreting section 
315 of the Communications Act of 1934. First, the ruling reflects the U.S. Supreme Court’s 
desire to avert intermediaries from censoring content by third parties. Second, the ruling creates 
a strong presumption for intermediaries to be exempt from liability for third-party content since 
they do not have to right to censor the content. Still to this day the aforementioned logic applies, 
and the modern safe harbor policies are based on it.45 
2.1.2 Knowledge is Power …and Liability 
On November 19, 1956, police arrested William Rothweiler, an employee of Eleazar Smith’s 
bookstore. In the end, prosecutors charged Eleazar Smith. Smith was a Polish immigrant in his 
seventies and the owner of the bookstore in Los Angeles’ skid row. At the time Los Angeles 
had an ordinance that prohibited certain businesses from possessing obscene material. Section 
21.01.1 of the Los Angeles Municipal Code stated: “It shall be unlawful for any person to have 
in his possession any obscene or indecent writing, book, pamphlet, picture, photograph, drawing 
. . . in any place of business where ice-cream, soft drinks, candy, food, school supplies, maga-
zines, books, pamphlets, papers, pictures or postcards are sold or kept for sale.”46 Rothweiler 
had sold the book Sweeter Than Life, by Mark Tryon, to an undercover officer. Sweeter Than 
Life would by today’s standards certainly not be considered obscene. However, the book depicts 
graphically sex, even sex between members of the same gender, which in the 1950s was widely 
frowned upon.47  
 
44 Conclusion, Farmers Educational & Cooperative Union of America v. WDAY, Inc. (n.d.). Oyez. Retrieved Jan-
uary 4, 2021, from https://www.oyez.org/cases/1958/248  
45 Kosseff 2019, p. 16–17. 
46 Smith v. California, 361 US 147, 172 n.1 (1959). 
47 Kosseff 2019, p. 19–20. 
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There were two main questions that needed to be answered: was Sweeter Than Life or any other 
literature sold in the bookstore considered obscene and could Smith be held liable as a passive 
distributor if the book were considered obscene? 
Both the Los Angeles Municipal Court and the Appellate Department of the Superior Court of 
Los Angeles County held that Smith was guilty of violating the obscenity ordinance by selling 
Sweeter Than Life. The judges were appalled by the graphic language used in the book. “The 
effect on me was one of depression,” said Judge Pope from Los Angeles Municipal Court after 
reading the book. It was evident that the judges’ minds were made up about the obscenity of the 
book and requests to bring in expert witnesses were denied. The remaining question was then: 
could Smith be held liable even if he did not know about the book? Smith and his attorney 
Stanley Fleishman argued that Smith’s bookstore had thousands of books and there was no way 
for Smith to know about their content. Smith did not even choose the books in his store; they 
were bought in bulk from publishers. Smith was sentenced to 30 days in city jail. A divided 
three-judge panel of the Appellate Department of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County 
affirmed Smith’s conviction. The Court held that the city’s obscenity ordinance does not require 
the bookseller to be aware of the obscene material in order to be held criminally liable. The 
dissenting judge noted that there was a similar state obscenity law, but with the key difference 
that it only applied to those who “willfully and lewdly” sold obscene materials. He further rea-
soned much like the defendant, that the vendor cannot possibly know about the content of every 
book sold.48 
Smith’s attorneys appealed the decision to the U.S. Supreme Court. Their key argument was 
that Smith lacked scienter. He had no intent nor knowledge of illegality. They further argued 
that if the ordinance in fact imposed a strict criminal liability, it would come into conflict with 
the Due Process Clause in the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution. Addi-
tionally, they argued much like in the lower courts, that Sweeter Than Life was not obscene. The 
arguments presented at the Supreme Court were diverse. Roger Arnebergh, the Los Angeles 
City Attorney took quite a different approach. He essentially made three distinct arguments. 
First of all, according to him, the city’s obscenity ordinance had not stifled freedom of speech. 
 
48 State v. Smith, Superior Court No. CR A 3792, Trial Court No. 57898 (Cal. Ct. App. 
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The ordinance had existed for a long time and Los Angeles still had plenty of bookstores, said 
Arnebergh. Secondly, Arnebergh argued that it was unreasonable having to prove that the de-
fendant knew about the obscenity of the book that was sold. If that was the case, then it would 
be easier to avoid liability by having a bigger bookstore. The more books there are, the harder 
it is to prove that the owner knows about the content of the books. Lastly Arnebergh pivoted to 
a peculiar argument. His fundamental argument was that since copyright law protects books, 
books are property and not speech, and shall therefore not be protected by the First Amend-
ment.49 
Arnebergh’s last argument turned out to be a mistake. The Supreme Court decided unanimously 
for Smith. The Supreme Court issued five different opinions, a majority opinion, three concur-
ring opinion and one dissenting opinion. All justices, except for Harlan, agreed that the obscen-
ity ordinance had a chilling effect on speech and thus violated the Constitution. Justice Brennan, 
who delivered the majority opinion, argued that a bookseller, such as Smith could not be held 
criminally liable without scienter. The First Amendment fundamentalists Black and Douglas 
argued that restriction on speech was unconstitutional regardless of scienter. Justice Frankfurter 
noted that a distributor should not be exempt from liability if he insulates himself against 
knowledge about an illegal book. Harlan agreed that Smith’s conviction should be overturned, 
but not because of the unconstitutionality of the ordinance. Instead, Harlan reasoned that the 
appellant’s evidence and testimony should have been admitted. “This had the effect of depriving 
appellant of the opportunity to offer any proof on a constitutionally relevant issue”, wrote Harlan 
in the dissenting opinion. Arnebergh’s copyright argument was not even mentioned in the ma-
jority opinion. Unlike the lower courts, the Supreme Court was not particularly interested in 
discussing the obscenity of Sweeter Than Life. At core, it was a case about intermediary liability 
and freedom of expression.50 
Despite the conflicting views among the justices, eight out of nine agreed with the majority 
opinion which stands to this day: under the protection of the First Amendment content distribu-
tors cannot be held liable for third-party content, unless they knew or had reason to know about 
 
49 Oral Argument Transcript, Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147 (1959). Retrieved January 26, 2021, from 
https://www.oyez.org/cases/1959/9  
50 Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147 (1959). 
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the infringing content.51 The rule applies to more than just obscenity and bookstores. It applies 
to all intermediaries and covers for instance also defamation. A modern example would be a 
webpage that lets users post content. If the service provider does not know about, for example, 
defamatory content uploaded by a user, it is not liable by the rule established by Smith v. Cali-
fornia.52 
However, the Supreme Court did not resolve all problems concerning intermediary secondary 
liability. The Smith v. California rule led to an absurd situation, where intermediaries might 
reduce their risk of liability by insulating themselves from knowledge about illegal content. It 
is precisely what Justice Frankfurter tried to prevent from happening. “The Court does not hold 
that a bookseller who insulates himself against knowledge about an offending book is thereby 
free to maintain an emporium for smut.”53, Frankfurter wrote in his concurring opinion. Still, 
that was only Frankfurter’s opinion, and it would take almost half a century to finally settle the 
issue.54  
2.1.3 Illustrating the Smith Rule  
The Smith v. California rule creates a strong incentive for intermediaries to take a hands-off 
approach regarding the content they distribute to the public.55 The less they know, the lower the 
risk of liability is. Briefly examining three defamation cases, involving stores selling porno-
graphic content, will clearly illustrate how the Smith v. California rule was later applied and 
what the limitation of it were. 
In the early 1980s, Kenneth Osmond, a former child television star, sued EWAP, owner of the 
adult book and video store Le Sex Shoppe. One of the movies that the L.A.-based Le Sex Shoppe 
sold was titled Supercock. The cover of the cassette implicitly claimed that the movie starred 
Osmond. At the time, Osmond was a Los Angeles Police Department officer. Osmond was baf-
fled when LAPD’s internal affairs department began questioning him about the movie. When 
he realized what was going on, he decided to sue EWAP for libel. The case is in many ways 
 
51 Kosseff 2019, p. 27. 
52 Ibid. 
53 Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147 (1959). 
54 Kosseff 2019, p. 28. 
55 Id. at p. 30. 
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comparable to Smith v. California. Much like Smith had done, EWAP claimed that they were 
merely a passive distributor and knew nothing about the content of movies they sold. EWAP 
was not involved in producing or publishing any films. Their involvement ended at simply buy-
ing and selling the films. The trial judge granted summary judgment in favor of EWAP and 
dismissed the case. Osmond appealed but the dismissal was unanimously upheld. The conclu-
sion was clear, Smith v. California had set a precedent that was followed. However, the Court 
of Appeals of California held that “innocence is generally considered a defense where such 
defendants merely circulate another's libel unless ‘they knew or should have known’ of the de-
famatory nature of the material.”.56 The court recognized that a distributor “may avoid liability 
by showing there was no reason to believe it to be a libel”.57 In other words, the distributor 
cannot necessarily avoid liability through ignorance. The court left open the possibility that im-
munity from liability does not apply to those who turn the blind eye to illegal content.  
A few years after the Osmond v. EWAP case, another similar lawsuit occurred. The circum-
stances were somewhat different, but the Smith v. California rule was similarly applied. This 
time the plaintiff was an American feminist and activist by the name of Andrea Dworkin. 
Dworkin was an outspoken critic of the victimizing effects of pornography on women, which 
made her an enemy of the porn industry.58 Perhaps her most fervent adversary was Larry Flynt, 
the publisher of Hustler. In 1984, Hustler published several features about Dworkin. Dworkins 
action against Hustler arose from three of those features. One of them was “a cartoon that por-
trays two women apparently engaging in cunnilingus. One woman says to the other, ‘You re-
mind me so much of Andrea Dworkin, Edna. It's a dog-eat-dog world.’”59 The problem for 
Dworkin was that by the 1980s, the views on pornography had radically changed, and it would 
be difficult to get courts to rule pornography unconstitutional. Dworkin’s attorney Gerry 
Spence, a famous Wyoming trial lawyer, came up with the idea of utilizing his local popularity 
by forum shopping. He knew that it was most likely that the lawsuit would not stand a chance 
in California, where Hustler was based, so he tried to move the trial to Wyoming.60 There was 
just one problem, Wyoming state court lacked jurisdiction. Spence solved the procedural 
 
56 Osmond v. EWAP, 153 Cal.App.3d 842, 847 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984). 
57 Ibid. 
58 Andrea Dworkin, Britannica. Retrieved January 29, 2021, from https://www.britannica.com/biography/Andrea-
Dworkin 
59 Dworkin v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 611 F. Supp. 781 (D. Wyo. 1985). 
60 Kosseff 2019, p. 31. 
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problem by having Dworkin also sue Park Place Market, a Jackson, Wyoming, store that sold 
Hustler. In 1985 the US District Court for the District of Wyoming ruled that “Because of the 
lack of evidence of scienter on the part of Park Place, the Court must find that in deciding the 
question of diversity it must ignore the presence of Park Place as being ‘fraudulently joined.’”.61 
Park Place’s liability was evaluated much like in Smith v. California and Osmond v. EWAP. As 
the plaintiffs failed to prove scienter on the part of Park Place, the court denied the plaintiffs’ 
motion to remand. The case was eventually transferred to a federal court in Los Angeles, where 
all claims were dismissed. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed 
the dismissal, concluding that the First Amendment protected Hustler features as “opinion” 
pieces.62 This would not be the last lawsuit involving Flynt and Park Place Market.  
On May 12, 1986, Spence filed a lawsuit against Flynt and Park Palace. This time Spence him-
self was the plaintiff. Due to Spence’s decision to represent Dworkin, he was personally attacked 
by Hustler by being named "Asshole of the Month.", "vermin-infested turd dispenser", "parasitic 
scum-sucker", "shameless shithole” and so on.63 The case was for the most parts nearly identical 
to Dworkin v. Hustler. Nevertheless, there was one key difference this time. Park Place could 
no longer claim ignorance regarding the content of Hustler. They were still involved in the pre-
vious lawsuit, making it evident that they knew about Hustler’s controversial nature. As a result, 
Park Place was to be considered a legitimate defendant and the US District Court for the District 
of Wyoming granted the plaintiff’s motion to remand. 64 Having the same judge come to the 
complete opposite conclusion in two almost identical cases, indubitably portrays how erratic the 
legal landscape was becoming with the emerging technologies. It started to become increasingly 
evident that something would have to be done regarding the legislation. 
2.1.4 No Control, No Liability! 
In the 1990s, computers and Internet became increasingly common in U.S. households. The 
Web as we know it today, was developed in the early 90s and became widely adopted in the late 
90s. Prior to that, online service providers such as CompuServe were used to connect to the 
 
61 Dworkin v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 611 F. Supp. 781 (D. Wyo. 1985). 
62 Dworkin v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 867 F. 2d 1188 (9th Cir. 1989). 
63 Spence v. Flynt, 816 P.2d 771 (Wyo. 1991). 
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Internet. CompuServe Information Service was a subscription-based “electronic library”65 that 
among other things, hosted online bulletin boards and online versions of newspapers. The ser-
vice allowed users to post comments on a wide range of different themed bulletin boards, and 
even to chat with each other. CompuServe adopted a hands-off approach regarding the content 
that was posted on their bulletin boards. Administration of the bulletin boards was generally 
outsourced to external contractors, such as Cameron Communications, Inc. (“CCI”).66 Com-
puServe had contracted CCI to administer Journalism Forum, one of CompuServe’s bulletin 
boards. CCI had further subcontracted Don Fitzpatrick Associates of San Francisco ("DFA") to 
publish Rumorville USA ("Rumorville"), which was a daily newsletter that provided reports 
about broadcast journalism and journalists. CompuServe had no direct relationship with DFA, 
nor could they review Rumorville’s content before it was uploaded to the Journalism Forum.67 
In 1990, Robert Blanchard (“Blanchard”) and his company Cubby Inc. (“Cubby”) developed 
Skuttlebut, a computer database designed to publish and distribute electronically news and gos-
sip in the television news and radio industries. Skuttlebut was intended to compete with Rumor-
ville, despite the fact that Skuttlebut distributed their newsletters mainly by fax, as they were 
not yet affiliated with an online service provider.68 On April 12, 1990, Rumorville published an 
article accusing Skuttlebut of stealing news items from Rumorville. Rumorville alleged that 
Skuttlebut had gained access to Rumorville’s information “through some back door”. The fol-
lowing day, Rumorville went on to claim that Blanchard had been fired from a previous job at 
WABC (New York ABC television affiliate) and that Skuttlebut was a “new start-up scam”.69 
Blanchard and Cubby filed a lawsuit against both Don Fitzpatrick (head of DFA) and Com-
puServe. The lawsuit claimed that the false statements constituted business disparagement of 
Cubby, libel of Blanchard, and unfair competition as to Skuttlebut, based largely upon the al-
legedly defamatory statements contained in Rumorville.70 Cubby claimed that CompuServe was 
the publisher of the defamatory statements and should, pursuant to federal and state defamation 
law, also be held liable. It was the first suit on record that sought to hold an online service 
 
65 Cubby, Inc. v. CompuServe Inc., 776 F. Supp. 135 (S.D.N.Y. 1991). 
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69 Cubby, Inc. v. CompuServe Inc., 776 F. Supp. 135 (S.D.N.Y. 1991). 
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provider liable for a third-party content.71 CompuServe did not even attempt to dispute the de-
famatory nature of the content. Instead, CompuServe argued that they were merely a passive 
distributor of Rumorville and had no ability to control what Rumorville published. The plaintiffs 
claimed that CompuServe did have editorial control over Rumorville. CompuServe could deny 
DFA from uploading content and even remove content if they wanted to. Therefore, Com-
puServe should be considered a publisher, not a distributor.  
Judge Leisure did not agree with the plaintiffs’ contention. In the court’s opinion, he recognized 
that CompuServe could in fact choose whether they contracted DFA to provide content or not. 
However, once CompuServe decided to contract DFA to manage the forum and provide content, 
they no longer had control of the content that was uploaded. With these arguments, Judge Lei-
sure concluded that CompuServe shall be considered a distributor, and not a publisher.72 Judge 
Leisure’s approach was pragmatic. He realized that the opposite conclusion would mean that 
online service providers would have immense liability, to the point where they probably could 
no longer function. After concluding that CompuServe was merely a distributor, it was only a 
matter of applying the correct legislation. The case was the first of its kind, so the court had to 
seek guidance from older precedents. “The requirement that a distributor must have knowledge 
of the contents of a publication before liability can be imposed for distributing that publication 
is deeply rooted in the First Amendment, made applicable to the states through the Fourteenth 
Amendment.”73, Judge Leisure wrote in his opinion.  He backed up the argument by referring 
to Smith v. California. It was clear that the same standards that had been established several 
decades earlier, would still apply. The plaintiffs would have to prove that the defendants knew, 
or at least should have known about the defamatory content. 
On October 29, 1991, the court granted summary judgement in favor of CompuServe. Judge 
Leisure wrote in his opinion: “Plaintiffs have not set forth any specific facts showing that there 
is a genuine issue as to whether CompuServe knew or had reason to know of Rumorville's con-
tents.” and “CompuServe, as a news distributor, may not be held liable if it neither knew nor 
had reason to know of the allegedly defamatory Rumorville statements”.74 The decision 
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eventually proved to be a double-edged sword. It effectively created a two-step test for online 
service providers to be insulated from liability for third-party content. First, the online service 
provider must not have any editorial control over third-party content in order to qualify as dis-
tributor, rather than a publisher. Second, the online service provider must not have any 
knowledge or reason to know of the infringing third-party content.75 If either of these two con-
ditions were not met, the online service provider could face liability. As a result, the decision 
removed any legal incentive for online service providers to monitor or moderate third-party 
content on their platforms. Another case involving Prodigy, one of CompuServe’s largest com-
petitors, would a few years later display how preposterous conditions Cubby v. CompuServe 
had created.  
2.1.5 The Moderation Paradox 
Three years after the Cubby v. CompuServe ruling, it was time to apply for the first time the 
two-step test that it had established. Nevertheless, this time the defendant was one of Com-
puServe’s largest competitors— Prodigy. Prodigy had bulletin boards that worked similarly to 
CompuServe’s. One of Prodigy’s most notable bulletin boards was called Money Talk. In a 
sense, Money Talk was similar to modern forums, as users could post comments and communi-
cate with each other. The bulletin board was nonetheless not yet on the World Wide Web. In 
October of 1994, a person with the username “David Lusby” posted multiple libelous messages 
on Money Talk about the securities brokerage Stratton Oakmont. Essentially, Lusby accused 
Stratton Oakmont of “criminal fraud”.76 To this day, it remains unknown who the person behind 
the username David Lusby was. 
On November 7, 1994, Stratton Oakmont filed a lawsuit against Prodigy and “David Lusby”, 
mostly focusing on libel and negligence. In accordance with the aforementioned two-step test, 
the court had to first determine whether Prodigy was a distributor or publisher. Prodigy were 
clearly not the ones writing the libelous posts, but they could be held liable if it were proven 
that they exercised editorial control. The plaintiffs had four key arguments for why Prodigy 
ought to be considered a publisher: 
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1) Prodigy’s Director of Marketing Programs and Communications had written multiple 
articles to national newspapers about how Prodigy holds themselves out as an online 
service that exercises editorial control over the content posted on their bulletin boards, 
thereby expressly differentiating themselves from their competition and expressly 
likening themselves to a newspaper. 
2) Prodigy promulgated content guidelines in which they, inter alia, requested users to re-
frain from posting insulting comments and claimed that they would remove any content 
that violated their content guidelines. 
3) Prodigy used a software screening program which automatically prescreened all bulletin 
board postings for offensive language. 
4) Prodigy used Board Leaders whose duties included enforcement of the content guide-
lines. The Board Leaders had the ability to remove content as they pleased.77     
The defendants tried to argue that they had changed the policies since and no longer exercised 
the alleged kind of editorial control. The plaintiff’s evidence was compelling nonetheless, and 
the court held that Prodigy had become akin to a publisher with responsibility for defamatory 
postings that made it onto their site.78 Since Prodigy failed to meet the criteria of step one in the 
two-step test, it did not matter whether they knew about the libelous content or not. They were 
already considered a publisher which brought on liability for all content on their platform. 
The decision was widely criticized. The court had held that an online service provider that mon-
itored and moderated content was akin to a traditional publisher such as a newspaper. However, 
that train of thought was problematic—Prodigy received 60,000 postings daily—far more con-
tent than any traditional publisher had to deal with.79 It was virtually impossible to moderate all 
content that was uploaded to the bulletin boards. Any minor effort to keep the platform clean 
led to liability for all content, even though it could not be fully monitored. Large online service 








communications services in order to avoid liability. Either way, the consumers would suffer, 
and the technological development would be stifled.80 
A few months after the court’s decision, Prodigy apologized publicly for the libelous posts. It 
was enough for Stratton Oakmont to drop the lawsuit. Prodigy was naturally relieved not having 
to pay anything, but the court’s ruling finding Prodigy to be a publisher was still on the books. 
Usually, a company would not be too concerned about a ruling of a state trial judge. In this case 
there was hardly any case law, meaning that in future cases the courts would most likely consider 
the Stratton Oakmont v. Prodigy decision. As the ruling had not been favorable for Prodigy, 
they wanted it to be changed. They requested reargument which Stratton Oakmont did not op-
pose. Still, the request was denied. The judge argued that there was a real need for some prece-
dent and the fact that Stratton Oakmont had dropped the lawsuit did not change it.81 It would 
not take long after this highly controversial ruling before the legislators decided to take action, 
the situation was unbearable.   
2.2 Communications Decency Act  
In 1995, the U.S. Congress was in the middle of a substantial overhaul of the outdated Commu-
nications Act of 1934. The Congress was primarily focused on telephones and cable TV.82 How-
ever, some members of the Congress were concerned about the lack of legislation for the Inter-
net. That year, Senators James Exon (D) and Slade Gorton (R) cosponsored a bill that was in-
tended to address the problem of children accessing pornography and other offensive material 
on the Internet.83 Meanwhile, Representatives Christopher Cox (R) and Ron Wyden (D) were 
working on a bill of their own. The Stratton Oakmont ruling was the straw that broke the camel’s 
back. Incentivizing online service providers to take a hands-off approach would stifle the devel-
opment of the Internet. Cox and Wyden knew something had to be done.84 Their solution was 
what is today commonly known as Section 230. The amendment was intended to protect online 
service providers, such as Prodigy, from liability for third-party content. In its final bill, the U.S. 
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congressional conference committee decided to combine both the Exon-Gorton and Cox-Wyden 
bills into Title V of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, also known as Communications De-
cency Act of 1996.85 The fact that the Cox-Wyden amendment became together with the Exon-
Gorton amendment part of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, and consequently the CDA, 
was merely a coincidence. The timing of the legislative overhaul just happened to be favorable.      
2.2.1 Strike Down on the CDA 
The CDA faced immediate opposition. On the day that President Clinton signed the bill, the 
ACLU together with 19 other plaintiffs sued to prevent the CDA from being enforced. The 
plaintiffs argued that “the censorship provisions were unconstitutional because they would crim-
inalize expression protected by the First Amendment and because the terms ‘indecency’ and 
‘patently offensive’ are unconstitutionally overbroad and vague.”86 A federal three-judge panel 
ruled in favor of the plaintiffs and subsequently the government appealed to the U.S. Supreme 
Court. The government were no more successful in the Supreme Court than in the lower court. 
Justice John Paul Stevens wrote in the opinion of the court:  
“We are persuaded that the CDA lacks the precision that the First Amendment requires 
when a statute regulates the content of speech. In order to deny minors access to poten-
tially harmful speech, the CDA effectively suppresses a large amount of speech that 
adults have a constitutional right to receive and to address to one another. That burden 
on adult speech is unacceptable if less restrictive alternatives would be at least as effec-
tive in achieving the legitimate purpose that the statute was enacted to serve.”87 
In other words, the Supreme Court concurred with the plaintiffs’ arguments. On June 26, 1997, 
the Supreme Court unanimously struck down the CDA, except for Section 230.88 All that re-
mained of the CDA was the Cox-Wyden amendment.89  
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2.2.2 The Cox-Wyden Amendment: Section 230 
Section 230, or 47 U.S.C. § 230, as it is officially codified, is a rather lengthy piece of legislation. 
However, the most significant part boils down to subsections 230(c)(1) and (c)(2):    
(c) Protection for "Good Samaritan" blocking and screening of offensive material 
(1) Treatment of publisher or speaker 
No provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be treated as the publisher 
or speaker of any information provided by another information content provider. 
(2) Civil liability 
No provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be held liable on account 
of- 
(A) any action voluntarily taken in good faith to restrict access to or availability of ma-
terial that the provider or user considers to be obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, exces-
sively violent, harassing, or otherwise objectionable, whether or not such material is 
constitutionally protected; or 
(B) any action taken to enable or make available to information content providers or 
others the technical means to restrict access to material described in paragraph 
The most renowned part of Section 230 is the 26 words in subsection (c)(1). Section 230 (c)(1) 
provides immunity from liability for “providers” and “users of interactive computer service” 
who publish third-party content. The million-dollar question then is: what is an interactive com-
puter service? Unfortunately, it is exceedingly difficult to give a thorough and accurate answer 
because the answer keeps changing. It is an ongoing debate how Section 230 (c)(1) should be 
interpreted and every once in while courts marginally alter the interpretation. Section 230 (f)(2) 
is intended to help with the interpretation of what an interactive computer service is. It states: 
“The term ‘interactive computer service’ means any information service, system, or ac-
cess software provider that provides or enables computer access by multiple users to a 
computer server, including specifically a service or system that provides access to the 
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Internet and such systems operated or services offered by libraries or educational insti-
tutions.”90 
The definition is somewhat outdated, but in the very least it provides a guideline. A modern 
example of this includes all of the major social media platforms. Section 230 provides immunity 
from liability for Facebook, Youtube, Amazon, Twitter and generally any other service that 
provides a platform for third-party content.91 Even traditional publishers such as newspapers or 
blogs can gain immunity for, say a reader comment section. Newspapers and blogs are nonethe-
less liable for what they publish themselves since they can control that content. Section 230 
provides immunity from liability only for third-party content, in this example the comment sec-
tion.        
Section 230 (c)(2) further provides protection from civil liability for “Good Samaritan” blocking 
and screening of offensive material. It seems like the statute is a direct response to the Stratton 
Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Services Co. ruling as the statute perfectly fits the case. However, 
some scholars think that Section 230 (c)(2) might be superfluous.92 Section 230 (c)(1) already 
provides immunity by stating that no provider or user of an “interactive computer service” shall 
be treated as a publisher, and as is known from previous case law, distributors are generally not 
liable for third-party content on their platforms. In other words, it seems like Section 230 (c)(2) 
is somewhat redundant.     
There are a few exceptions to the immunity from liability that Section 230 provides. The excep-
tions can be found in Section 230 (e): 
(1) No effect on criminal law 
 (2) No effect on intellectual property law 
 (3) State law 
 (4) No effect on communications privacy law 
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 (5) No effect on sex trafficking law 
A significant exception for intermediaries is that Section 230 (c) has no effect on intellectual 
property law. It means that Section 230 does provide protection for intermediaries for, say de-
famatory third-party content, but interestingly not for copyright infringing third-party content. 
Copyright infringing third-party party content is instead regulated by the Digital Millennium 
Copyright Act (“DMCA”). The exceptions of criminal law and intellectual property law were 
made in fear of attracting too much political opposition.93 If not, the U.S. could have ended up 
with a more comprehensive piece of legislation, such as the European counterpart Electronic 
Commerce Directive 2000.94 
2.2.3 The Court Approves of Section 230 Protection 
On April 25, 1995, six days after the Oklahoma City bombing, an anonymous user on America 
Online (AOL) posted a message advertising merchandise glorifying the bombing. People were 
instructed to call the plaintiff, Kenneth Zeran, if they were interested in buying the merchandise. 
Zeran had nothing to do with the post or the merchandise, yet he started receiving a barrage of 
angry calls. Zeran contacted America Online (AOL) to have the post removed, which they did. 
Shortly after the removal of the first post, a similar post appeared again. Zeran asked AOL to 
take it down as well, which they did, but the damage was already done. Zeran claims that in the 
final days of April he received abusive phone calls every two minutes. To make matters worse, 
a broadcaster at a radio station in Oklahoma City, read the slogans on air and encouraged listen-
ers to call Zeran and harass him. In January of 1996, Zeran filed suit against the radio station 
and in April of the same year, he filed a separate action against AOL. Zeran alleged that “AOL 
was negligent in failing to respond adequately to the bogus notices on its bulletin board after 
being made aware of their malicious and fraudulent nature”.95  
Zeran sued AOL for negligence, with the notion that intermediaries are liable for distribution of 
content which they “knew or should have known”96 was of a defamatory character. Zeran relied 
his claim on the Cubby holding, in which a service provider could not be held liable for 
 
93 Kosseff 2019, p. 66. 
94 Directive 2000/31/EC. 
95 Zeran v. America Online, Inc., 958 F. Supp. 1124 (E.D. Va. 1997). 
96 See Cubby, Inc. v. CompuServe Inc., 776 F. Supp. 135, 141 (S.D.N.Y.1991). 
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distributing defamatory statements unless it knew or had reason to know of the statements. Nat-
urally, AOL did not agree with the claim. Instead, AOL argued that the brand-new Section 230 
preempted the holding of Cubby. Nonetheless, there was a catch—the inflammatory messages 
had been posted prior to the enactment of Section 230. It meant that there were two questions at 
issue: 
1) does Section 230 apply to a lawsuit that is filed after its enactment but based on facts 
that occurred prior to its enactment?  
2) does Section 230 preempt Zeran’s state law negligence claim?97  
Zeran contended that applying Section 230 on his case would violate the stricture against retro-
active application of statutes. However, the District Court found that Congress had intended 
Section 230 to be applied to all suits filed after its enactment regardless of when the events that 
the suit arose from occurred. The District Court held that Section 230 (d)(3) “constitutes an 
adequately clear statement of Congress' intent to apply § 230 of the CDA to claims that are filed 
after the enactment of the CDA”.98 
The District Court further found that Section 230 (d)(3) is not intended to preempt state law—
to the contrary, it is intended to retain state law remedies, unless the state law remedies conflict 
with Section 230. Yet, the Supremacy Clause99 commands preemption of state law whenever it 
directly conflicts with federal law. With those arguments, the District Court held that Zeran’s 
suit conflicted with both the express language and purposes of Section 230.100   
In conclusion, the answer is yes to both of the questions above and consequently AOL’s motion 
for judgement on the pleadings was granted. Zeran appealed to the Fourth Circuit, but the Fourth 
Circuit granted judgement in favor of AOL. The Fourth Circuit held that each of Zeran’s claims 
were barred by Section 230 as it "creates a federal immunity to any cause of action that would 
make service providers liable for information originating with a third-party user of the service.” 
101 After having lost again, Zeran petitioned to the U.S. Supreme Court, but the court declined 
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to hear his case. Still to this day, Zeran provides extensive protection for intermediaries against 
liability for third-party content. 
2.2.4 Scope of Section 230 Immunity 
The most challenging, yet crucial question on the subject of Section 230 is how to determine 
whether someone is an Information Computer Service (distributor/intermediary) or an Infor-
mation Content Provider (publisher). Publishers are liable for third-party content, whereas in-
termediaries are immune. That is to say, the distinction makes all the difference. The problem 
is that frequently, it is not as clear cut as one would think. Especially in the Internet era, the 
amount of online service providers has skyrocketed, meaning that there is a multitude of varia-
tion between each one of them.102 Before the enactment of Section 230, the solution was to 
prohibit intermediaries from all editing and monitoring of third-party content, or else they were 
considered publishers. Section 230 (c) now allows blocking and screening of third-party content 
provided it is done in good faith. That in turn created a new quandary: how much can the inter-
mediary be involved in the content without becoming liable as a publisher?103 
It is a question that courts across the U.S. have had to consider multiple times. Zeran set the 
tone for other courts by concluding that Section 230 creates a federal immunity to any cause of 
action that would make service providers liable for information originating with a third-party 
user of the service. The holding provided broad immunity to intermediaries and to this day it 
still largely stands.104 There have been numerous cases aligning with Zeran, too many to cover 
all of them here.  
However, one particularly interesting case is Blumenthal v. Drudge.105 Drudge was contracted 
by AOL to write a column for AOL. One of the articles was defamatory and consequently Blu-
menthal sued both AOL for hosting the article and Drudge for publishing it. The Court found 
no liability for AOL, despite AOL's contractual relationship with the creator of the defamatory 
content and the fact that AOL had board managers that were supposed to monitor and edit such 
illegal content. The Court held that Section 230 was meant to provide immunity to service 
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providers in exactly this kind of cases. The key takeaway is that Section 230 precludes courts 
from entertaining claims that would place service providers in a publisher's role even when the 
service provider has had an active role in soliciting the content.106 
There are nonetheless some cases too that have outlined the limits of Section 230. In Fair Hous-
ing Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.com, LLC107, the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, sitting en banc, held that Section 230 did not provide immunity 
to an online service provider that used dropdown menus in a questionnaire. Due to the dropdown 
menus which offered prefilled answers, Section 230 (c)(1) “information provided by another 
information content provider” condition was not met. The Court held that the defendant was an 
information content provider. For other parts of the website, the defendant was considered an 
interactive computer service, thus gaining immunity from liability. It is possible for an online 
service provider to be both an intermediary and a publisher. It is also worth noting that even the 
slightest contribution to the content may bar an online service provider from Section 230 im-
munity.108 
In Barnes v. Yahoo!109, Barnes who was a user of Yahoo, had asked Yahoo to remove objec-
tionable third-party content about her. Yahoo promised Barnes to remove the content but then 
failed to do so. The Court held that pursuant to Section 230 Yahoo had no obligation to remove 
third-party content. The Court consequently dismissed Barnes’ tort claim. However, the Court 
found that Section 230 does not bar a promissory estoppel claim. The reason for it is that Ya-
hoo’s liability comes from the promise to remove the content instead of their publishing conduct. 
It is sort of a contractual liability, which Section 230 does not preclude.110 Section 230 does not 
contain a notice-and-takedown policy, but apparently it does not preclude it either provided that 
the liability is not based on the intermediary’s publishing conduct. This is one of the distinguish-
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In Anthony v. Yahoo! Inc.111, Section 230 (c)(1) was not applied because Yahoo had created the 
fraudulent content themselves and did accordingly not meet the standards. Gucci America, Inc. 
v. Hall & Associates112 is another case where the Court held that Section 230 was not applicable. 
This time it was due to the fact that Section 230 does not provide protection against trademark 
infringement claims. Intellectual property law is one of the few explicit exceptions listed in 
Section 230 (e).  
It seems like it is futile to attempt forming an exact definition for the extent of Section 230’s 
application. Numerous cases have already explored its boundaries and slightly shifted the scope 
of it. Since every case is unique, there will undoubtedly be more cases in the future further 
elucidating the application of Section 230. So far, courts have been inclined to follow Zeran’s 
precedent by applying Section 230 extensively. Curiously, many scholars seem to disagree with 
Zeran, in that Congress’ intent was actually not to create such a broad immunity. A common 
notion seems to be that the Court was right by ruling in favor of AOL, but the arguments they 
used created too broad of an immunity.113  
2.3 Liability for Third-party Copyright Infringement 
2.3.1 Legitimate Use of the “Betamax” 
In the 1970s, Sony sold a consumer-level video tape recorder called the “Betamax”. The Beta-
max allowed consumers to record television programs and watch them later. Universal City 
Studios alongside with multiple other media companies sued Sony for copyright infringement, 
alleging that the Betamax was used to record their copyrighted works, thus making Sony liable 
for copyright infringement. The California District Court had to address two fundamental ques-
tions:  
1) does recording television programs for noncommercial home use constitute copyright 
infringement? 
 
111 Anthony v. Yahoo! Inc., 421 F.Supp.2d 1257 (N.D.Cal. 2006). 
112 Gucci America, Inc. v. Hall & Associates, 135 F. Supp. 2d 409 (S.D.N.Y. 2001). 
113 See e.g., Patel 2002, p. 679–689; Freiwald 2001, p. 594–596; McManus 2001, p. 647–; Pantazis 1999, p. 547–
550; Kane 1999, p. 488–489; Wiener 1999, p. 905–; Barrett v. Rosenthal, 114 Cal. App. 4th 1379, 1395 (2004).    
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2) Does Sony's sale and marketing of the Betamax to the general public constitute con-
tributory infringement of copyrighted public broadcasts under the Copyright Act of 
1976? 
The District Court ruled in favor of Sony, finding that time-shifting for noncommercial purposes 
was indeed legitimate fair use, and that Sony’s actions did not constitute contributory infringe-
ment.114 The Ninth Circuit Court reversed the District Court’s decision in part,115 after which 
Sony appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court. The issue that the Supreme Court had to tackle was 
whether or not Sony’s sale of video tape recorders to the general public violated the respondents’ 
copyrights. In a 5-4 opinion, the Supreme Court held that the sale of the video tape recorders to 
the general public does not constitute contributory infringement of respondents' copyrights.116 
The Court rationalized the holding with two main arguments: most of the Betamax users used 
it for its intended legitimate purpose of time-shifting broadcasts, and moreover the plaintiffs 
failed to demonstrate that time-shifting would cause non-minimal harm to the value of their 
copyrighted works.117 The “Betamax case” is still to date a significant landmark case. Especially 
noteworthy is the argument about Sony not being liable for contributory infringement because 
of the legitimate purposes and substantial non-infringing uses of the Betamax.  
2.3.2 Digital Millennium Copyright Act  
The Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA)118 was signed into law in 1998 in hopes of 
bringing U.S. copyright law "squarely into the digital age."119. The DMCA implements two 
1996 World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) treaties and addresses a number of other 
significant copyright-related issues.120 The DMCA was not created from scratch, instead it was 
built on case law concerning secondary liability for copyright infringement such as the Betamax 
case.121 In the DMCA, it is Title II, the Online Copyright Infringement Liability Limitation Act 
 
114 Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp. of America, 429 F. Supp. 407 (C.D. Cal. 1977). 
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(OCILLA or Section 512)122, that regulates online service providers’ secondary liability. It af-
fords online service providers protection from liability for copyright infringement if they meet 
certain conditions. There are two general conditions that must always be met to be eligible for 
Section 512 protection: 
i. online service providers must adopt and reasonably implement a policy of terminat-
ing in appropriate circumstances the accounts of users who are repeat infringers; and 
ii. they must accommodate and not interfere with “standard technical measures.”123 
Additionally, the online service provider must qualify for at least one of the following catego-
ries: 
i. Transitory communications;124 
ii. System caching;125 
iii. Storage of information on systems or networks at direction of users;126 and 
iv. Information location tools.127 
Each of the four above-mentioned categories have a subset of conditions that have to be met in 
order to qualify for protection.128 An online service provider that meets the two general condi-
tions and the conditions of any of the four alternative provisions is granted full protection from 
liability for monetary damages and partial protection from injunctive relief.129 Failure to meet 
the conditions does not automatically induce liability for copyright infringement to the online 
service provider. For that to happen, the copyright owner must prove the violation while the 
service provider may still avail itself of defenses such as fair use.130 Copyright owners may also 
request a court to issue a subpoena to an online service provider for identification of an alleged 
infringer.131 
 
122 17 U.S.C. § 512. 
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Of the four provisions, DMCA 512(c) is predominantly applied to online service providers af-
fording them insulation from liability for copyright infringements committed by their users. In 
order to be eligible for the protection, online service provider must meet the following condi-
tions:  
“(1) In general. —A service provider shall not be liable for monetary relief, or, except 
as provided in subsection (j), for injunctive or other equitable relief, for infringement of 
copyright by reason of the storage at the direction of a user of material that resides on a 
system or network controlled or operated by or for the service provider, if the service 
provider— 
(A) (i) does not have actual knowledge that the material or an activity using the ma-
terial on the system or network is infringing; 
(ii) in the absence of such actual knowledge, is not aware of facts or circum-
stances from which infringing activity is apparent; or 
(iii) upon obtaining such knowledge or awareness, acts expeditiously to remove, 
or disable access to, the material; 
(B) does not receive a financial benefit directly attributable to the infringing activity, in 
a case in which the service provider has the right and ability to control such activity; and 
(C) upon notification of claimed infringement as described in paragraph (3), responds 
expeditiously to remove, or disable access to, the material that is claimed to be infringing 
or to be the subject of infringing activity.”132 
Unlike Section 230, the DMCA 512 (c)(1)(A) bars protection if the online service provider knew 
or should have known about the infringing content.133 The provision emanates from case law 
predating the enactment of the DMCA.134 Since the DMCA unequivocally bars strict liability 
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for online service providers, a form of effective system for copyright owners to protect their 
rights had to be instituted.135  
The solution was a notice-and-takedown policy, which is yet another difference compared to 
Section 230. The simple concept of the notice-and-takedown policy is that the copyright owner 
notifies the online service provider of copyright infringement, after which the online service 
provider has to remove the flagged content or else, they become liable.136 The notice-and-
takedown procedure is brilliant in many ways, but it does not come without its problems. The 
system has been widely abused in different ways. According to one study, nearly a third of 
Google’s takedown requests were invalid.137 According to Google’s Transparency Report, 
Google has received more than five billion takedown notices, which means that Google alone 
may have received nearly two billion bogus DMCA takedown notices.138 An increasing amount 
of the takedown notices are automatically sent by bots, meaning that there is no human interac-
tion. The DMCA mandates that takedown notices must be based on a “good faith belief”139 that 
the content is infringing. It is difficult to see how a bot could act based on good faith belief. It 
seems like there is an inherent need for human interaction to do so. The bots are however not 
the only source of bogus takedown notices. Online service providers often prefer to play safe 
and remove flagged content regardless of the validity of the claim, as they do not want to risk 
becoming liable.140 On the flip side of the coin, copyright owners and even scammers have 
discovered it and are abusing it by sending invalid takedown notices. Another typical misuse 
situation is where takedown notices are sent for content that fall under fair use. Moreover, cop-
yright owners have in some cases brought action against online service providers for third-party 
copyright infringement without having sent a takedown notice first.141 If successful, these kinds 
of lawsuits undermine the entire notice-and-takedown system.       
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2.3.3 Peer-to-Peer File Sharing Services 
Peer-to-peer file sharing services constitute a distinctive challenge in the context of intermedi-
aries’ secondary liability for copyright infringement. Typically, a peer-to-peer file sharing ser-
vice will provide a platform that connects its users to each other. The users will then share 
content to each other. At first glance, these services are no different from other online interme-
diaries, such as the big social media platforms. Of course, there are different kinds of peer-to-
peer file sharing services. Some might moderate or organize content whereas others do not. In 
theory, some are passive service provider though and should on the face of it, not be liable for 
potential third-party infringements. However, copyright law puts its own spin on it changing 
how some things work. There are multiple high-profile peer-to-peer file sharing service cases, 
but A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc. was the first major case to apply copyright laws to such 
a service. 
Napster was an early peer-to-peer file sharing service that allowed its users to transmit a variety 
of files, but it was best known as a platform for sharing and downloading music for free in MP3 
format. Unsurprisingly, record companies did not like it, and in 1999, a number of them filed a 
motion for a preliminary injunction in order to stop the file sharing. Plaintiffs alleged Napster 
was liable for contributory and vicarious copyright infringement for providing a platform where 
users could obtain copyrighted works without copyright holders’ authorization. The district 
court granted plaintiffs the preliminary injunction and subsequently Napster appealed.142  
Napster claimed that their users’ activity fell under fair use.143 Napster made the argument that 
its users merely space-shifted the content and that it should therefore be protected under Sony 
Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc. The Ninth Circuit disagreed concluding that 
Sony was not applicable because it was the end user who time-shifted the broadcast, unlike in 
Napster. In Napster users first space-shifted the content and then shared it with others. It is 
clearly not the same to copy something for personal use and to copy something for later distri-
bution. Additionally, the Court did not buy into the idea that the content on Napster would con-
sist of samples and copies of songs that users already owned. The Court found that Napster 
knew that its service was mainly used for infringing activities and that it still had failed to 
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remove said content. It further found that Napster did indeed benefit from the file sharing and 
that it negatively impacted record sales and thus also revenue. As a result, the Ninth Circuit 
affirmed in part the District Court’s decision. The Ninth Circuit reversed in part the District 
Court’s decision because it found that it was the plaintiffs’ burden to notify Napster of any 
infringing content, which Napster would then remove. Napster did not possess the technology 
to recognize all infringing content and the Ninth Circuit found that it did not have to do so 
either.144 
MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd. is a U.S. Supreme Court decision from 2005. Grokster is 
commonly described as the successor to Napster because of the similar factual backgrounds. 
The district court ruled for Grokster, reasoning that the service could be used for legitimate 
purposes.145 The Ninth Circuit affirmed the decision. However, the Supreme Court found that 
the lower courts had misinterpreted the safe harbor established by Sony. The Supreme Court 
took issue with Grokster’s active role in marketing and managing the infringing activity. Justice 
Souter wrote in the Supreme Court’s opinion: 
“We hold that one who distributes a device with the object of promoting its use to in-
fringe copyright, as shown by clear expression or other affirmative steps taken to foster 
infringement, is liable for the resulting acts of infringement by third parties.”146 
The other concern was the extent of the service’s legitimate use. The plaintiffs were able to 
prove that upwards of 90 percent of the content was copyrighted. Clearly, the service had hardly 
any commercially significant non-infringing use. The Copyright Act did not expressly make 
online service providers liable for third-party infringement, but the Supreme Court argued that 
secondary liability doctrines should be applied. The “only practical alternative”147 was to go 
against the online service provider for secondary liability. Going after individual users of the 
service would have been futile. Essentially with said arguments, the Supreme Court vacated the 
Ninth Circuit’s judgement.148      
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In conclusion, online service provider’s liability for third-party copyright infringements seem 
to be affected by at least two things:  
1) does the product have commercially significant non-infringing use; and 
2) is the intermediary inducing copyright infringement. 
These two conditions have been considered in all of the copyright cases I covered, but interest-
ingly they are rarely considered in the context of the Section 230. Is there are reason why the 
same logic could not be applied beyond copyright law? If not, would it make sense to do so? 
Nevertheless, the Grokster and Betamax cases remain two of the most significant cases of sec-
ondary liability jurisprudence in the U.S.149   
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3 Intermediary Liability in the EU   
3.1 Electronic Commerce Directive 2000 
When the Internet started growing and e-commerce began gaining traction in the 90s, the EU 
and the U.S. were poles apart in terms of the legal landscape. In the late 90s, the U.S. had enacted 
two significant pieces of legislation on Internet law, whereas the EU still had no harmonized 
legislation worth mentioning.150 The same was true for case law. Some member states in the EU 
did have national legislation that touched on the topic, but nothing significant enough to discuss 
here. The new legislation in the U.S. was at least partly a product of cases involving online 
service providers. The EU on the other hand, did not have prior harmonized legislation, which 
meant that there was no relevant case law either. In the late 90s, the EU decided that it needed 
to catch up with the legislation, not to fall too much behind in the development of e-commerce. 
On June 8, 2000, the Electronic Commerce Directive (ECD)151 came into force.152 The idea was 
to promote the growth of e-commerce by creating a coherent regulatory framework.153 The ECD 
covers a wide range of topics, including advertising, spam, online contracts, online orders, en-
forcing existing legislation, and last but not least—liability of service providers. The directive 
covers essentially all types of commercial online services, including:  
i. “news services (such as news websites) 
ii. selling (books, financial services, travel services, etc.) 
iii. advertising 
iv. professional services (lawyers, doctors, estate agents) 
v. entertainment services 
vi. basic intermediary services (Internet access, transmission and hosting of information) 
vii. free services funded by advertising, sponsorship, etc.”154  
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The list above does however not directly apply to the statutes about service provider liability. 
The EU regime for intermediary service provider’s liability consists of Articles 12-15 of the 
ECD and some provisions of the Copyright Directive (2001/29/EC).155 Articles 12-15 of the 
ECD contain three provisions under which service providers can be exempt from liability for 
third-party infringements—"Mere conduit”, “Caching” and Hosting. The remaining Article is a 
ban on obligation to monitor content. The exemptions cover all kinds of illegal content, includ-
ing copyright infringements and defamation. They also provide protection from both civil and 
criminal liability.156  
This is the most significant difference compared to the U.S. system is that the U.S. system is 
divided in to the DMCA and the CDA, whereas the European counterpart is just one Directive. 
It means that the ECD must be different than at least one of the corresponding U.S. statutes. The 
ECD’s exemptions parallel the ones of the DMCA, meaning that the CDA is somewhat unique 
compared to the European legislation. The reason for the Directive being so similar to the 
DMCA, is at least in part because it is modelled on it.157 Just like in Section 512(c) of the 
DMCA, the Directive’s hosting safe harbor is built around a notice-and-takedown scheme.158 
The fact that the U.S. is a federation, and the EU is a union, also makes a difference. The ECD 
being a directive, means that there is national variation between the member states in regard to 
how the act is implemented and enforced. In the U.S. on the other hand, there is more extensive 
and coherent enforcement from the top level. Of the cases concerning intermediary liability that 
reach the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU), a vast majority is dealing with intel-
lectual property law. The case law is heavily focused on hosting safe harbors under Article 14 
and the prohibition on general monitoring obligation under Article 15.159           
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3.1.1 Mere Conduit 
Article 12 of the ECD contains the exemption for mere conduits. This refers to situations where 
service providers act as passive intermediaries. Article 12(1) stipulates that a service provider 
will not be liable for third-party content on the condition that the provider:   
(a) does not initiate the transmission; 
(b) does not select the receiver of the transmission; and 
(c) does not select or modify the information contained in the transmission. 
The conditions stipulated in Article 12(1) are effectively a more precise description of a passive 
service. The service provider may not create the content, have knowledge of it, nor control it. If 
any one of the conditions is not met, the service provider has failed to act as a mere conduit and 
will accordingly not be exempt from liability under Article 12.160 Unlike Articles 13 and 14, 
Article 12 does not contain an explicit notice-and-takedown scheme. However, Recital 42 of the 
directive states that the exemptions only cover cases where the “service provider has neither 
knowledge of nor control over the information which is transmitted or stored”. Additionally, 
Article 12(3) stipulates that it does not prevent courts or authorities from requiring the service 
provider to terminate or prevent an infringement. The conclusion seems to be that a service 
provider acting in good faith can be exempt from liability under Article 12 but gaining 
knowledge of an infringement will revoke the protection.161 
McFadden v. Sony Music162 is one of very few ECJ cases that have touched on the mere conduit 
provision. McFadden was the owner of a lightning and sound rental business and as a way to 
promote his business, he provided a free Wi-Fi connection. The Wi-Fi connection was not pass-
word protected, meaning anyone in the vicinity of his store could access it. In 2010, a music file 
on which Sony Music claimed ownership was illegally shared using the connection. About a 
month later, McFadden received a cease-and-desist letter from Sony Music demanding him to 
stop the infringing activity. McFadden asserted that he did not personally commit the alleged 
infringement and in return he brought an action for a negative declaration (‘negative 
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Feststellungsklage’). In reply to McFadden’s claims, Sony Music made several counterclaims. 
Sony Music sought to obtain from McFadden: “first, payment of damages on the ground of his 
direct liability for the infringement of its rights over the phonogram, second, an injunction 
against the infringement of its rights on pain of a penalty and, third, reimbursement of the costs 
of giving formal notice and court costs.”.163 On January 16, 2014, the referring court dismissed 
Mc Fadden’s action and upheld the counterclaims of Sony Music. McFadden appealed the de-
cision, claiming that he is exempt from liability under the provisions of German law transposing 
Article 12(1) of the ECD. In the appeal, Sony Music claimed that the court should uphold the 
judgement at first instance or alternatively order McFadden to pay damages for allowing third 
parties to infringe their rights. The German Court was uncertain whether the mere conduit safe 
harbor was applicable or not, so they referred a number of preliminary questions to the European 
Court of Justice (ECJ). In essence, the referring court wanted to know if McFadden qualified as 
an “information society service” by providing an open Wi-Fi connection to attract potential 
customers and how extensive was the protection of Article 12.  
The ECJ found that “information society services” typically covers services provided for remu-
neration164, however, providing free Wi-Fi connection for advertising purposes was also of 
“economic nature”165. The Court made a broad interpretation and accepted that Article 12 was 
applicable to businesses that provided open Wi-Fi connection as a form of advertisement. Fur-
thermore, the Court held that McFadden met the conditions of Article 12(1) and should therefore 
be afforded its protection. The ensuing question was, how broad was the immunity provided by 
Article 12? The Court held that Article 12 provides immunity from all liability. Sony Music was 
not entitled to claim compensation nor reimbursement for legal expenses. Article 12 did how-
ever not bar the copyright holder from seeking injunction from national authorities in order to 
stop the infringing activity. Lastly, the problem was determining an appropriate deterrent meas-
ure to stop the infringing activity. The measure must be effective enough to stop the infringe-
ment but targeted enough so that it does not restrict legitimate use of the Wi-Fi connection. The 
ECJ found that a complete ban on offering Wi-Fi would violate Articles 11 and 16 of the Charter 
of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. Ultimately, the ECJ settled for an injunction 
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which requires the service provider to make the Wi-Fi connection password protected. The 
Court noted that the password protection is only effective if the users are required to reveal their 
identity in order to obtain the password to the Wi-Fi connection. This kind of a scheme would 
interfere with the aforementioned freedoms, but only marginally.166 
McFadden is an interesting decision which provides some guideline to the application and extent 
of the mere conduit safe harbor. It is also a good reminder of how challenging it can be to strike 
a balance between different freedoms and rights. On one side there is copyright, which is essen-
tial for a well-functioning economy, and on the other side there is the freedom of expression, 
information and conducting business, which are also essential for the same reasons. It seems as 
if McFadden could severely limit the viability of offering open Wi-Fi connection as a means of 
marketing.167 This might though be one those decisions that becomes at least partly obsolete 
with time. Mobile Internet connections have already become so common, that the need for Wi-
Fi connection has drastically decreased since 2010 when the infringement of the McFadden case 
took place.     
Another case that touches on Article 12, although not to the same extent as McFadden, is Sotiris 
Papasavvas v. O Fileleftheros Dimosia Etairia Ltd., Takis Kounnafi, Giorgos Sertis.168 Pa-
pasavvas is a decision that explored in more general terms the application of Articles 12-14. 
What makes the decision so intriguing is that it is a defamation lawsuit involving a newspaper—
a prime example of an intermediary liability case, which is rare in the ECJ. In 2010, Papasavvas 
sued a newspaper company, its editor-in-Chief and one of its journalists for defamation because 
of some articles they had written. Papasavvas sought damages for harm and requested the na-
tional court to order a prohibitory injunction to stop the articles from being published. The re-
ferring court had a plethora of questions for the ECJ concerning the application of Articles 12-
14. Nevertheless, the decision boils down to two fundamental questions:  
1) does the definition of “information society service” in the ECD cover online information 
services that are funded by means of commercial advertisements rather than directly by 
the recipient? 
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2) Can a newspaper that operates a free website get protection under any of the safe harbors 
of Articles 12-14? 
The first question is important because if the service provider cannot be considered an infor-
mation society service, then all of the safe harbors are automatically off-limits. The question is 
practically identical to the one in McFadden, and so is the conclusion. The Court held that the 
term “information society service” should be interpreted broadly. Recital 18 in the preamble of 
the ECD supports the conclusion. In other words, a newspaper that is funded with advertisement 
money can be considered an “information society service”. The second question is in fact also 
rather simple to answer in light of the theoretical background. A newspaper that publishes arti-
cles is a textbook example of something that does not meet the criteria for the safe harbors. A 
newspaper has editorial control over the content that it publishes and therefore there is no need 
to limit its liability. So even on a conceptual level it does not work in favor of the newspaper. 
For the ECJ, it was simply as easy as looking at the conditions stipulated in Article 12-14. The 
newspaper was clearly not just a “mere conduit” or passive in any sense, meaning that it was 
outside the scope of the safe harbors.169 
In the context of the ECD and its U.S. counterparts, the decision was very much foreseeable. 
The decision is in line with the fundamental concept of intermediary liability and safe harbors. 
If anything, it is odd that the referring court would ask questions that are seemingly so obvious. 
Perhaps it is the lack of case law from the ECJ that uncertainty, in which case it is good to get 
these decisions even for seemingly simple questions.170    
3.1.2 Caching 
In computing, caching is the process of storing copies of files in a temporary storage location, 
so that future requests for that data are served up faster than is possible by accessing the data’s 
primary storage location. By doing so, reuse of previously retrieved or computed data is fast and 
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efficient.171 Caching can be performed both by the end-user and the service provider.172 Article 
13 of the ECD is the safe harbor for caching. Considering the purpose and the technology of 
caching, caching is perfectly in line with other exemptions from liability. Caching is simply a 
tool for making computing more efficient and it does not typically involve intent or active ac-
tions of any kind. Article 13 does stipulate a number of conditions for the service provider to be 
exempt from liability for caching. A “service provider is not liable for the automatic, interme-
diate and temporary storage of that information, performed for the sole purpose of making more 
efficient the information's onward transmission to other recipients of the service upon their re-
quest, on condition that: 
(a) the provider does not modify the information; 
(b) the provider complies with conditions on access to the information; 
(c) the provider complies with rules regarding the updating of the information, specified 
in a manner widely recognised and used by industry; 
(d) the provider does not interfere with the lawful use of technology, widely recognised 
and used by industry, to obtain data on the use of the information; and 
(e) the provider acts expeditiously to remove or to disable access to the information it 
has stored upon obtaining actual knowledge of the fact that the information at the initial 
source of the transmission has been removed from the network, or access to it has been 
disabled, or that a court or an administrative authority has ordered such removal or dis-
ablement.”173 
Most of the provision boils down to that the purpose of caching must be to facilitate the flow of 
information to the intended recipient, which is anyway the primary purpose of the technology. 
Article 13(1)(e) is different though—it imposes a notice-and-takedown scheme. The service 
provider must “expeditiously” remove or disable access to infringing content after becoming 
aware of it. “Obtaining actual knowledge” could happen independently or by notice from a third 
party. The notice-and-takedown scheme is what makes the caching safe harbor quite different 
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from the mere conduit safe harbor. Similar to the other safe harbors of the ECD, Article 13(2) 
stipulates that the safe harbor does not preclude authorities from requiring the service provider 
to terminate or prevent an infringement. 
The fact that no direct ruling on Article 13 in the context of intermediaries exist,174 suggests that 
caching is rarely used for other than its intended purpose. It is also possible that caching is so 
technical that the infringed party does not even detect the infringement. Local temporary copies 
of files for faster access are certainly not as easy to find as for example a published article or 
other publicly available content online.   
3.1.3 Hosting 
Article 14 of the ECD relates to hosting, which involves, inter alia, managing websites for end-
users.175 Article 14(1) reads as follows: 
“Where an information society service is provided that consists of the storage of infor-
mation provided by a recipient of the service, Member States shall ensure that the service 
provider is not liable for the information stored at the request of a recipient of the service, 
on condition that: 
(a) the provider does not have actual knowledge of illegal activity or information and, 
as regards claims for damages, is not aware of facts or circumstances from which the 
illegal activity or information is apparent; or 
(b) the provider, upon obtaining such knowledge or awareness, acts expeditiously to 
remove or to disable access to the information.”176 
According to the provision, the hosting safe harbor applies to a service provider that stores in-
formation provided by a user of the service. The provision does not further specify what kind of 
services are covered. Instead, it has been up to the courts to interpret the extent of Article 14’s 
application. The CJEU has interpreted the safe harbor to cover a wide range of services such as 
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social media platforms177 and e-commerce platforms178. Naturally, there are plenty of hosting 
services that fit the description but have not been explicitly confirmed by the CJEU to fall under 
Article 14. Certain examples include web hosting, online media sharing platforms, file storage 
and sharing, cloud computing services, social networking and discussion forums, collaborative 
production, online marketplaces, collaborative economy, online games, search tools, and rating 
and reviews.179 A substantial amount of the world’s most popular online services fit the descrip-
tion.  
There are however two exceptions to the rule. Firstly, if the service provider knew or should 
have known about the infringement and fails to remove or disable access to the information, the 
safe harbor does not apply.180 A typical example of it would be peer-to-peer file sharing websites 
where the service provider usually either knows or should know that the service is mainly used 
for illegal purposes. The second exception is that the safe harbor does not apply if the user of 
the service is acting under the “authority or the control” of the provider.181 The entire idea of 
the safe harbors is to insulate service providers from liability for third-party infringements. If 
the user is acting under the control of the service provider, the user is effectively no longer a 
third party and the service provider should not be insulated from liability for its infringements.  
Identical to the mere conduit and caching safe harbors, the hosting safe harbor does not preclude 
authorities from requiring the service provider to terminate or prevent an infringement.182 How-
ever, one unique feature of Article 14 is that it also allows Member States to establish procedures 
governing the removal or disabling of access to information. 
Hosting is an extensively utilized safe harbor, which means that there are multiple CJEU cases 
relating to it. Google France SARL and Google Inc. v Louis Vuitton Malletier SA183 is a note-
worthy example of such a case, as it clarified that search engines operators do not infringe trade-
mark rights if they allow advertisers to use a third party’s trademark as a keyword. Google, the 
defendant in the case, operates a free search engine. The search engine works by means of an 
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algorithm identifying keywords and presenting the user with a list of results.184 In addition to 
the natural results, Google operates an advertisement system called “AdWords”, which suggests 
sponsored links based on the keywords used. The sponsored search results are differentiated 
from the natural results so the user can tell them apart.185 AdWords is an automated process that 
allows advertisers to choose keywords that they want to lead to their link. Every time a user 
clicks the sponsored link, Google gets compensated, meaning that it is in Google’s interest to 
make the advertisements appealing and effective.186 As a result, Google provides some data to 
advertisers, such as the number of searches on its search engine featuring the selected keywords, 
as well as related keywords, and the corresponding number of advertisers.187 
In 2003, Luis Vuitton (“LV”), a French luxury goods company, discovered that sponsored links 
leading to websites selling counterfeit LV products showed up when Google users typed in key-
words containing LV’s trademarks, such as “Luis Vuitton”, “LV” and “Vuitton”. Not only could 
advertisers use LV’s trademarks as keywords, but Google also offered those keywords in com-
bination with words like “imitation” and “copy”.188 LV brought proceeding against Google, 
inter alia, seeking a declaration that Google had infringed its trademarks.189 Google lost both in 
the Tribunal de grande instance de Paris and in Cour d’appel de Paris. Google further appealed 
to the Cour de cassation, which then referred three questions to the CJEU for a preliminary 
ruling. Essentially, the questions revolved around whether Google could be enjoined from using 
trademarked keywords or otherwise be held liable for offering such service.190 
The Court concluded that based on European copyright law, LV has the right to prohibit Google 
from using keywords identical with LV’s trademark in its sponsored links.191 The Court was 
more lenient towards Google concerning the liability question. The Court held that “it is neces-
sary to examine whether the role played by that service provider is neutral, in the sense that its 
conduct is merely technical, automatic and passive, pointing to a lack of knowledge or control 
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of the data which it stores”.192 Additionally, the Court pointed out that Google must not be 
precluded Article 14 protection for the mere fact that their referencing service is subject to pay-
ment.193  
The fact that the entry of a search term matches the keyword is also not sufficient to justify the 
view that Google has knowledge of, or control over the data.194 Lastly, the Court concluded that 
if the service provider lacked knowledge or control over the data, it cannot be held liable for 
data stored at the request of a third party.195 The decision provides broad protection for service 
providers. It seems to suggest that Google could only be held liable if they were explicitly noti-
fied about the specific infringement and they still failed to remove the infringing content.196 The 
decision is not really controversial, but it provides a valuable guideline to how Article 14(1)(a) 
should be interpreted.  
Only a year later, the CJEU gave another closely related decision. However, this time the dispute 
was between L’Oréal and eBay.197 L’Oréal is an international personal care company that man-
ufactures and supplies cosmetics, perfumes, and hair care products. L’Oréal holds a number of 
national trademarks in the United Kingdom as well as Community trademarks.198 It operates a 
“closed selective distribution network”, which means that authorized distributors are not al-
lowed to further supply products to other distributors.199 eBay on the other hand, is a multina-
tional e-commerce corporation that facilitates sales through its website. A part of eBay’s reve-
nue comes from commissions on sales of products.200 All users must accept eBay’s user agree-
ment in order to buy or sell on the platform. One of the terms in that agreement is a prohibition 
on selling counterfeit products and on infringing trademarks.201 In certain instances, eBay assists 
sellers to describe and categorize their products, create their own web stores, and even advertises 
the product on third party websites.202  
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In 2007, L’Oréal expressed its concerns regarding the widespread sale of infringing goods on 
eBay’s European websites and requested eBay to take action to address the concerns.203 Not 
being satisfied with eBay’s response, L’Oréal brought several actions against eBay in various 
Member States.204 L’Oréal claimed that eBay was jointly liable for multiple infringements.205 
The British High Court of Justice was one of the courts that had been brought action before. The 
High Court of Justice decided to stay the proceeding and referred a plethora of questions to the 
CJEU for a preliminary ruling.206 The referred questions were largely same as in Google v. Luis 
Vuitton. Essentially, the questions revolved around whether eBay could be enjoined from ad-
vertising trademarked goods without the consent of L’Oréal and whether they were protected 
under the hosting safe harbor of Article 14.207 
Regarding the first question, the Court came to the exact same conclusion as in Google France, 
even referring to the decision. L’Oréal can prohibit eBay from advertising products that infringe 
on L’Oréal’s trademarks, as long as certain conditions are met.208 Unsurprisingly, the conclusion 
regarding liability was much the same as in Google France due to the near identical questions. 
The Court found that a service provider does not fall within the scope of Article 14 “where the 
service provider, instead of confining itself to providing that service neutrally by a merely tech-
nical and automatic processing of the data provided by its customers, plays an active role of 
such a kind as to give it knowledge of, or control over, those data”.209 The important question 
then was whether eBay played an active role or not. That is where eBay differed from Google. 
Google had setup an automated and passive system, whereas eBay was actively promoting its 
sellers in multiple ways.210 The Court held that a service provider cannot rely on the hosting 
safe harbor of Article 14 of the ECD if: 
“the operator has provided assistance which entails, in particular, optimising the presenta-
tion of the offers for sale in question or promoting those offers, it must be considered not to 
have taken a neutral position between the customer-seller concerned and potential buyers 
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but to have played an active role of such a kind as to give it knowledge of, or control over, 
the data relating to those offers for sale.”211 
The Court concluded that it was for the referring court to examine whether eBay played such a 
role or not.212 Moreover, the Court held that the service provider could not rely on exemption 
from liability “if it was aware of facts or circumstances on the basis of which a diligent economic 
operator should have realised that the offers for sale in question were unlawful and, in the event 
of it being so aware, failed to act expeditiously in accordance with Article 14(1)(b) of Directive 
2000/31.”.213  
The decision does manage to shed some light on the interpretation of Article 14 by providing 
an example of what constitutes an “active” service provider. Apparently, optimizing the presen-
tation and promoting offers implies that the service provider might have played an active role, 
thus becoming liable. In contrast, based on Google France and L’Oréal, it should be safe to say 
that making money on the service, providing general information, and setting terms of service 
does not mean that the service provider has played an active role.214  
3.1.4 No Obligation to Monitor 
Article 15 of the ECD is a prohibition against imposing a general obligation to monitor on online 
service providers. The prohibition applies to services covered by Article 12-14 when they trans-
mit or store information.215 Article 15(1) also stipulates that Member States shall not impose a 
general obligation “actively to seek facts or circumstances indicating illegal activity”. The for-
mer rule means that service providers do not have an obligation to passively observe activity on 
their platform, whereas the latter means that the service providers do not have an obligation to 
actively seek infringements.216 Essentially, service providers do not have to do anything to de-
tect infringements on their platforms. 
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Pursuant to Article 15(2), the service provider does nonetheless have to cooperate with author-
ities. Member States may establish obligations for service providers to inform authorities of 
alleged illegal activities at the authorities’ request. Authorities have the right to receive “infor-
mation enabling the identification of recipients with whom the service providers have storage 
agreements.”217  
The primary rule is, that abstract non-target filtering is a violation of free speech and is therefore 
banned. Unsurprisingly, there are exceptions to the ban on monitoring content. Plenty of CJEU 
cases touch on the topic of Article 15, as the rights-holders are keen on finding ways to protects 
their assets. L’Oréal218 is a good example of a case where the referring court asked a plethora 
of questions, including one about monitoring. In that case, the CJEU held that measures may be 
taken by a trading platform against repeated infringers.219 McFadden220 is another case that 
touched on the topic of monitoring. That time, the CJEU held that password-locking is an ap-
propriate measure to stop infringing activity on an open Wi-Fi network.221 The CJEU has both 
ruled for some exceptions to the general rule of Article 15 and against violations of its principles. 
One of the most notable rulings relating to Article 15, is Eva Glawischnig-Piesczek v Facebook 
Ireland Limited.222 In 2016, a Facebook223 user shared an article on his Facebook wall, generat-
ing a thumbnail with the photograph of Ms. Glawischnig-Piesczek—an Austrian politician of 
The Greens parliamentary party.224 The user also published defamatory comments about Ms. 
Glawischnig-Piesczek in connection to the article.225 A few months after the Facebook post was 
published, Ms. Glawischnig-Piesczek requested Facebook Ireland to take it down.226 Facebook 
did not comply with Ms. Glawischnig-Piesczek’s request, so she decided to bring action before 
the Austrian Commercial Court. The Court issued an interim order to disable access to the 
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defamatory post. Facebook did disable access to the content, but only in Austria.227 The decision 
was appealed all the way to the Supreme Court of Austria.228 The Supreme Court decided to 
stay the proceedings and refer a few questions to the CJEU for a preliminary ruling.  
The Supreme Court essentially asked whether Article 15(1) precluded courts from: 
i. ordering online service providers to remove or block access to content that is “iden-
tical” to content which was previously declared illegal 
ii. ordering online service providers to remove or block access to content that is “equiv-
alent” to content which was previously declared illegal 
iii. ruling for a worldwide injunction.229 
The CJEU held that despite Article 15(1) prohibiting a general obligation to monitor content, it 
does not prohibit courts from ordering an obligation to monitor “in a specific case”.230 A good 
example of such a specific case is when the court has already declared content to be illegal.231 
Given that it is so effortless to reupload or share content on social media platforms, it is quite 
likely that the defamatory content would show up again, if the platform does not prevent it.232 
If the content is already declared illegal, it does not matter who requests the storage of said 
information, the service provider may be ordered to take it down regardless. This does not mean 
that the service provider has a general obligation to monitor content, instead it must target the 
infringing content.233  
The CJEU noted that the effects of an injunction could easily be circumvented if users were 
allowed to post equivalent content that was only slightly altered from the original illegal post. 
The CJEU held that “in order for an injunction which is intended to bring an end to an illegal 
act and to prevent it being repeated, in addition to any further impairment of the interests in-
volved, to be capable of achieving those objectives effectively, that injunction must be able to 
extend to information, the content of which, whilst essentially conveying the same message, is 
worded slightly differently, because of the words used or their combination, compared with the 
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information whose content was declared to be illegal”.234 The Court found it to be necessary to 
extend the monitoring to equivalent content, in order to effectively protect a person’s reputation 
and honor.235 The biggest problem with extending monitoring to equivalent content, is to outline 
what exactly constitutes “equivalent” content. The decision mentions that “specific elements 
which are properly identified in the injunction, such as the name of the person concerned by the 
infringement determined previously, the circumstances in which that infringement was deter-
mined and equivalent content to that which was declared to be illegal”236, can be used to identify 
equivalent content. The Court does not go into more detail about how the service provider should 
identify “equivalent” content, leaving it ambiguously up for interpretation. 
Lastly, the CJEU held, referring to Article 18(1), that the ECD does not have any territorial 
limitation to the scope of the measures which Member States are entitled to adopt.237 However, 
the Court noted that it is up to the national court to ensure that the EU rules are consistent with 
the international laws.238 The CJEU merely found that the ECD itself does not restrict a global 
reach.  
To sum up the takeaway, the CJEU ruled that courts may impose an obligation on service pro-
viders to remove identical and equivalent content to what has already been declared illegal. The 
Court justified its approach with the desire to provide people with effective protection against 
defamatory content. Any other conclusion would have made it significantly harder for the in-
fringed party to take effective action. The only puzzling question is, how exactly the service 
providers should determine what content is “equivalent” to the original content. The Court did 
provide some guidelines, but it will surely be a topic of discussion in the future.    
The CJEU has also ruled against the use of filtering mechanisms pursuant to Article 15 of the 
ECD. There are two such cases involving the same plaintiff—SABAM. SABAM is a Belgian 
collective management organization that represents authors, composers, and publishers.239 One 
of its responsibilities is to authorize the use of copyright-protected works for third parties.240 
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Both in SABAM v. Netlog NV241 and in Scarlet Extended SA v. SABAM242, SABAM tried to 
impose filtering systems on service providers in order to protect copyrights. Netlog was an 
“online social networking platform” where members could create a profile, chat, play games, 
share videos and pictures and so on. Scarlet, on the other hand, is an Internet service provider 
which merely provides access to the Internet. Netlog and Scarlet did have something in com-
mon, people used their services to illegally distribute copyright-protected works such as movies 
and music. 
In both cases, SABAM brought action against the defendants demanding them, inter alia, to 
“cease and desist from making available to the public musical and audio-visual works from 
SABAM’s repertoire without the necessary authorization”243. The Belgian courts were uncertain 
about the legality of such injunctions and decided to refer the question to the CJEU. In both 
cases, the referred questions are almost identical word for word.  
The referring courts asked, in essence, whether Directives 2000/31, 2001/29, 2004/48, 95/46 
and 2002/58, read together and construed in the light of the requirements stemming from the 
protection of the applicable fundamental rights, must be interpreted as precluding an injunction 
against a hosting service provider or an ISP which requires it to install a system for filtering: 
i. information which is stored on its servers by its service users; 
ii. all electronic communications passing via its services, in particular those involving 
the use of peer-to-peer software; 
iii. which applies indiscriminately to all of those users; 
iv. as a preventative measure; 
v. exclusively at its expense; and 
vi. for an unlimited period,     
which is capable of identifying electronic files containing musical, cinematographic or audio-
visual work in respect of which the applicant claims to hold intellectual property rights, with a 
 
241 Case C‑360/10. 
242 Case C-70/10. 
243 SABAM v. Netlog NV C‑360/10, para 20; Scarlet Extended SA v. SABAM C-70/10, para 20: “SABAM also 
sought an order requiring Scarlet to bring such infringements to an end by blocking, or making it impossible for its 
customers to send or receive in any way, files containing a musical work using peer-to-peer software without the 
permission of the rightholders, on pain of a periodic penalty”. 
54 
 
view to preventing those works from being made available to the public in breach of copyright 
or blocking the transfer of files the sharing of which infringes copyright (‘the contested filtering 
system’).244 
Implementing such filtering system would require the service providers to: 
i. identify within all of the electronic communications of all its customers, the files 
relating to peer-to-peer traffic;245 
ii. identify the files containing works in respect of which holders of intellectual-prop-
erty rights claim to hold rights; 
iii. determine which of those files are being stored and made available to the public 
unlawfully; and 
iv. block file sharing that it considers to be unlawful246 
In order to be able to carry out all of the aforementioned measures, the service provider would 
effectively have to implement general monitoring, which is prohibited by Article 15(1) of the 
ECD.247 Moreover, such injunction would seriously infringe the service provider’s freedom to 
conduct business since it would have to implement complicated, costly, and permanent techno-
logical solutions at its own expense, which Article 3(1) of Directive 2004/48 prohibits.248 Lastly, 
the CJEU voiced its concerns about the injunction restricting access to information. A general 
monitoring system would more than likely also block some legal content and infringe on the 
right to protection of personal data, thus violating Articles 8 and 11 of the EU Charter of Fun-
damental Rights.249 In both cases, the CJEU concluded that the legal framework of the EU pre-
cluded an injunction made against a service provider which would require it to implement a 
general monitoring system.250  
Courts appear to have an inclination to impose monitoring on service providers, whereas Article 
15(1) of the ECD expressly forbids a general obligation to monitor.251 Cases such as UPC 
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Telekabel Wien252, Glawischnig-Piesczek, McFadden, Google France and L’Oréal have all es-
tablished some kind of limitations to the “no general obligation to monitor” rule. Conversely, 
the two SABAM-cases represent a stricter interpretation of Article 15(1). However, it must be 
noted that SABAM demanded much more extensive monitoring systems than any of the other 
aforementioned plaintiffs, which ultimately, is the reason behind the denial by the CJEU. It is 
apparent that the CJEU attempts to walk a fine line between protecting the rights-holders and 
protecting the service providers along with their users. Article 15(1) does evidently not provide 
full immunity for service providers against the need to filter or monitor content. Instead, it pro-
hibits authorities from imposing an extensive filtering system that would be unconscionably 
expensive to implement and intrusive against the users.         
3.2 DSM Directive 
The Directive on Copyright in the Digital Single Market (DSMD)253 is an EU directive which 
came into force on June 6, 2019. Member States are supposed to implement the directive by the 
summer of 2021. The DSMD updates the EU’s copyright legislation, which comprises of 11 
directives. The directive supplements the existing legislation, rather than replacing it. The aim 
of the directive is to adapt certain key exceptions to copyright to the digital and the cross-border 
environment, improve licensing practices and ensure wider access to content, and to achieve a 
well-functioning marketplace for copyright.254 Essentially, it is an effort to close the alleged 
“value gap” between online intermediaries and copyright holders, or in other words, an attempt 
to ensure that copyright holders get remunerated appropriately.255  
Article 17 is one of the most intricate and contentious articles of the directive.256 It is a signifi-
cant step towards consolidating the transformation of online intermediaries257 from passive neu-
tral services to active ‘gate-keepers’, through legislative means.258 The provision limits itself to 
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online intermediary liability relating to copyright infringing user-generated content. It does not 
affect the existing intermediary liability framework related to other illegal content such as de-
famatory statements, hate speech, violations of privacy, etc.259 Article 17 is an extensive provi-
sion with loads of substance, but I will attempt to break down its focal parts and analyze how it 
will affect online intermediary liability in the EU. What Article 17 does, is it in fact introduces 
a new type of safe harbor by imposing new obligations on online intermediaries.260 Conse-
quently, the important question is what online intermediaries must do in order to avoid liability 
under Article 17. The answer can be broken down into two main parts: licensing and other con-
ditions.  
The directive introduces a new obligation for online intermediaries to obtain authorization from 
copyright holders, for instance by concluding a licensing agreement, in order to make publicly 
available copyright protected works.261 This policy also excludes the application of Article 14 
ECD,262 making online intermediaries clearly liable for user-uploaded copyright-infringing con-
tent on their platform, unless they meet the requirements of the Article 17 DSMD safe harbor.263 
There are some valid concerns with making licensing the primary way to avoid liability for 
online intermediaries. The practical process of concluding licensing agreements with all the 
rightsholders is a daunting, if not impossible task. The obvious solution is to turn to collecting 
societies. Though, even if the online intermediary finds a collecting society willing to enter into 
a licensing agreement with the umbrella effect meant in Article 17(2), it will still not solve the 
problem, for the collecting society landscape in Europe is highly fragmented.264 Large online 
platforms will have more resources and leverage to negotiate licenses across the EU. The licens-
ing obligation may thus bestow upon big players a competitive advantage that leads to further 
market concentration. The licensing obligation could lead to a decline in diversity of both con-
tent and service providers, making it a twofold risk from the perspective of both public and 
private interests.265 Concluding licensing agreements with reasonable terms could also prove to 
be a challenge, especially for smaller actors, considering the preemptive nature of the 
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agreement.266 In a lot of cases, neither contracting party will have knowledge of the quantity or 
quality of content that will be used. 
The other component of Article 17 DSMD is what happens when the online intermediary fails 
to obtain a licensing agreement. Under certain conditions the online intermediary can still be 
exempt from liability. The conditions are that the service provider has to demonstrate that it has: 
a) “made best efforts to obtain an authorisation, and 
b) made, in accordance with high industry standards of professional diligence, best efforts 
to ensure the unavailability of specific works and other subject matter for which the 
rightholders have provided the service providers with the relevant and necessary in-
formation; and in any event 
c) acted expeditiously, upon receiving a sufficiently substantiated notice from the 
rightholders, to disable access to, or to remove from their websites, the notified works 
or other subject matter, and made best efforts to prevent their future uploads in accord-
ance with point (b).”267 
Additionally, Article 17(5) DSMD stipulates that, among others, the type of service and content, 
the audience and the size of the service, and the availability of suitable and effective means and 
their cost for service providers are elements that shall be taken into account when determining 
whether the service provider has complied with its obligations under paragraph 4. 
The first thing that stands out is the number of conditions combined with equivocal word 
choices. Expressions such as “best efforts”, “high industry standards”, “relevant and necessary 
information”, and “expeditiously”, combined with most of paragraph 5, may very well cause 
confusion in national courts down the road and it will likely fall to the CJEU to interpret the 
meaning of such expressions.268  
Perhaps the biggest concern with the new provision is Article 17(4)(b), which requires the ser-
vice provider to “make best efforts” to ensure the unavailability of infringing content. Some 
scholars are concerned that it will culminate in a comprehensive filtering obligation,269 even 
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though Article 17(8) DSMD and Article 15 ECD explicitly forbids it.270 Despite this, it may be 
argued that the ISPs will still be forced to implement filtering measures mainly "to ensure the 
unavailability of specific works. Such obligation would also be a big concern considering fun-
damental rights to impart and receive information.271 The way Article 17(4) is phrased, it is less 
risky for service providers to filter too much than it is to filter only clear-cut cases of infringe-
ment. At the current level of technological sophistication, algorithms are often unable to accu-
rately identify the nuances between unauthorized and permissible use of copyright-protected 
content.272 Moreover, the provision does not provide any strong incentives for service providers 
to be cautious of over-blocking.273 The stricter filtering obligation signifies a change in the per-
ception of online intermediaries from being passive players to being active gate-keepers with 
the duty to avert the posting of infringing content on platforms managed by them.274 
Articles 17(6) and 17(7) contain exceptions to liability imposed by Article 17. Online interme-
diaries that have been available to the public in the EU for less than three years and that have an 
annual turnover below EUR 10 million do not need to comply with Article 17(4)(b). In other 
words, the monitoring obligation does not concern newer small service providers. The other 
exception is a special regime for fair use. The fair use exceptions are quotation, criticism, re-
view, caricature, parody, and pastiche. Previously, these were optional exceptions,275 but now 
the exceptions have become mandatory.276 On the face of it, these mandatory exceptions are 
great for freedom of expression. However, this provision too runs the risk of being difficult to 
accurately interpret despite a valiant effort to explain the exception in Recital 70 DSMD. 
The provision is also equipped with a section about redress procedure. Article 17(9) stipulates 
that service providers must have an effective and expeditious complaint and redress mechanism 
that is available to users of their services in the event of disputes over the disabling of access to, 
or the removal of content uploaded by them. In other words, there needs to be a counter notice 
system for the users of the service. The provision goes on to require that counter notices are 
processed without “undue delay” and decisions to disable access to or remove uploaded content 
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are subject to human review. Moreover, out-of-court redress mechanisms shall be available for 
the settlement of disputes. If it takes a long time for users to get the decision, it is foreseeable 
that the complaint and redress is incapable of safeguarding freedom of expression.277 Even a 
delay of a few days can make a significant difference for a content provider in the competitive 
online environment. Article 17(9) only regulates disputes over disabling of access to, or the 
removal or content. It was perhaps an oversight not to include monetization claims in the pro-
vision.278 Monetization claims are common on platforms such as Youtube and make up a sig-
nificant portion of all the copyright disputes on the platform. Why take down the content if you 
can claim the monetization instead?    
Article 17 is part of a broader policy push in the EU towards increased responsibility of online 
platforms, which comes largely at the cost of increased monitoring obligations and reduced 
freedom for users to engage with content online.279 Article 17 DSMD represents the withdrawal 
from a broad international harmony with legislation such as the DMCA. As large platforms face 
increasing scrutiny from lawmakers on issues unrelated to copyright, the political balance of 
power could shift in ways that would also embolden critics of the DMCA in the U.S.280 Varying 
national legal systems already create substantial uncertainty for online intermediaries as they 
face different liabilities and safe harbors depending on the applicable law. The fragmentation of 
online intermediary liability legislation caused by the implementation of Article 17 may slow 
down the growth of online service providers and perhaps even negatively impact the global 
economy.281 It remains to be seen whether the legislative revision of the role of online interme-
diaries under Article 17 as regards copyright-protected content will expand to other areas of 
intermediary liability such as defamation and hate speech.282 
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4 Comparative Analysis  
4.1 Knowledge of Infringement 
The role of intermediaries’ knowledge of infringement has been a topic of debate for decades. 
In the landmark case Smith v California from 1959, the U.S. Supreme Court held that content 
distributors cannot be held liable for third-party content, unless they knew or had reason to know 
about the infringing content. The two cases involving Hustler in the 1980s, demonstrated well 
the significance of awareness. In the two nearly indistinguishable cases, the court came to two 
completely different conclusions about intermediary liability due to the intermediary’s 
knowledge of infringement. The swift technological development and the rise of online service 
providers in the 1990s threw a wrench in the works. Some service providers decided to moderate 
the content on their platform, while others did not. This led to a problem with the decades old 
Smith rule. Service providers that moderated content were considered to become aware of in-
fringing content on their platforms, thus losing the status of distributor and becoming distribu-
tors instead. CompuServe and Prodigy came to embodiments of the absurdity also sometimes 
referred to as the “Good Samaritan paradox”. The Good Samaritan paradox disincentivizes ser-
vice providers to proactively monitor the legality of the material they host because, if they do 
so, they may lose the benefit of the liability exemption.283 This issue has been dealt with differ-
ently in different statutes. 
The first statute to address the Good Samaritan paradox was Section 230. Section 230 tackles 
the issue by guaranteeing protection for all service providers regardless of their awareness. Sec-
tion 230(c) is even titled “Protection for Good Samaritan blocking and screening of offensive 
material”. In the early days on online intermediaries, the concern was that online intermediaries 
are not effectively allowed to moderate user-generated content. Now it has changed and there 
are concerns that online intermediaries do not moderate content even though there are calls for 
them to do so. Some argue that they reap the benefits of immunity without monitoring.284 Actu-
ally, online intermediaries never had an obligation to moderate content before the Section 230 
either. Historically speaking, the immunity was not granted to intermediaries so that they could 
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monitor content, it was to guarantee freedom of expression.285 Perhaps, it is a valid concern that 
the unconditional immunity of all online intermediaries might be fostering a hands-off approach 
because it is easier and cheaper.286 It is also worth noting that a lot of services might want to 
moderate content in order to appeal to a broader audience, as was the case with Prodigy.287 
The DMCA and the ECD contain a much different approach to knowledge of infringement.288 
Many of their safe harbor provisions include a condition that the service provider must not have 
actual knowledge of illegal activity nor awareness of facts or circumstances from which the 
illegal activity or information is apparent. It effectively means that Section 230 affords online 
intermediaries far greater protection from liability than what the DMCA and the ECD does.  
The recently adopted Article 17 DSMD brings yet another approach to knowledge of infringe-
ment by not even mentioning it. It does not offer complete protection like Section 230 does, but 
it does neither explicitly rule out exemption from liability if the online intermediary had 
knowledge or reason to know about the infringement. As long as the online intermediary con-
forms to Article 17(4), it should gain protection from liability regardless of its level of aware-
ness.   
The safe harbor schemes of Section 230 and Article 17 DSMD have the advantage of not need-
ing to deal with the problem of determining when the online intermediary has had knowledge 
or should have known about an infringement. On the contrary, there has been plenty of debate 
about the knowledge issue in cases that fall outside of the scope of Section 230 and DSMD. 
Perhaps the most compelling argument regarding knowledge of infringement relates to inducing 
illegal activity. In L’Oréal, the CJEU made the connection that taking an active role in facilitat-
ing, or in other words, inducing illegal activity leads to knowledge of infringement. “Where, by 
contrast, the operator has provided assistance which entails, in particular, optimising the presen-
tation of the offers for sale in question or promoting those offers, it must be considered not to 
have taken a neutral position between the customer-seller concerned and potential buyers but to 
have played an active role of such a kind as to give it knowledge of, or control over, the data 
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relating to those offers for sale.”, the CJEU wrote.289 Nevertheless, for example in the Betamax 
case, the U.S. Supreme did not make the same connection, even though both subjects were under 
close scrutiny. It is worth noting though that Betamax predates any online intermediaries, which 
may explain the discrepancy. Inducing illegal activity might be one possible indicator to deter-
mine whether the online intermediary, but it is certainly not the entire solution. Safe harbor 
schemes such as Section 230 and Article 17 DSMD have the advantage of being unambiguous 
as there is nothing left for interpretation regarding the online intermediary’s knowledge of in-
fringement.   
4.2 Notice-and-Takedown 
Notice-and-takedown is a process which allows rightsholders to request online intermediaries 
to remove or disable access to infringing user-generated content. It is a negligence-based ap-
proach, meaning that it is a reactive rather than a proactive obligation for intermediaries290 As 
one might expect, Section 230 does not include such a scheme due to the complete immunity 
from liability that the law affords online intermediaries. Likewise, unsurprisingly, the DMCA 
and the ECD contain paragraphs on notice-and-takedown with almost the exact same phras-
ing.291 However, there is one significant difference between the DMCA’s and the ECD’s notice-
and-takedown regulation. Unlike the DMCA, the ECD does not define what constitutes a proper 
takedown notice.292 In the EU, it is up to each Member State to establish more specific proce-
dures and requirements. The distinction can therefore more likely be attributed to political rea-
sons than any legal argument. Lastly, Article 17(4)(c) DSMD also includes a notice-and-
takedown policy. The DSMD notice-and-takedown policy is sort of a hybrid of the latter two. It 
does not go into as much detail as section 512(c)(3) DMCA, but it offers more than the provi-
sions in the ECD. According to Article 17(4)(c) DSMD, online intermediaries must take action 
“upon receiving a sufficiently substantiated notice from the rightholders”. “Sufficiently substan-
tiated notice” goes straight to the rather lengthy list of ambiguous and thus problematic expres-
sions of the DSMD. Alas, Recital 66 DSMD which refers to the notice-and-takedown policy, 
does not provide any further help with the interpretation of what “sufficiently substantiated 
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notice” exactly means. Article 17(4)(c) DSMD is also unique in the sense that it obligates ser-
vice providers to make “best efforts” to prevent future uploads of content that has been taken 
down once. It means the DSMD’s notice-and-takedown scheme is in fact a notice-and-stay 
down scheme. In conclusion, two of the statutes include very similar notice-and-takedown pol-
icies, in fact one is actually a notice-and-stay down scheme, and Section 230 stands out by 
affording a uniquely broad protection for online intermediaries by not having a scheme at all.    
Notice-and-takedown schemes certainly have both advantages and disadvantages. Perhaps the 
loudest criticism relates to the chilling effect that notice-and-takedown procedures have on free 
speech. It is widely recognized that notice-and-takedown policies make service providers re-
move content too easily in fear of liability.293 Challenging the takedown requests may be an 
unappealing option due to intimidation, high legal risks, and a weak prospect of a successful 
redress.294 Service providers appear to fear lawsuits from rightsholders more than they do from 
users, which is not surprising considering the discrepancy in power between rightsholders and 
users on average. Not only is content being removed or disabled too easily, but takedown notices 
are also sent too often without any legitimate justification. A study conducted in the U.S. reveals 
that up to 30% of DMCA takedown notices were legally dubious, and 57% of DMCA notices 
were filed against competitors.295 This is at least partly believed to be due to the ease of the 
process.296 Senders of unwarranted takedown requests could perhaps be better held accountable 
with stricter liability. Currently, notice senders are rarely held liable for abusive requests.297An-
other reason for the high rate of bogus notices can be attributed to the large quantity of takedown 
notices that are sent by automated algorithmic systems. Lots of companies, especially large 
companies, use automated algorithmic systems due to their low maintenance costs and high 
efficiency. Google has possibly the most well-known content filtering system in the world called 
“Content ID”. Still, the convenience and low maintenance costs comes at the price of high error 
rate.298 Google’s Content ID has been called a “censorship machine”, rightsholders are 
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effectively forced to surrender control of their intellectual property to Google and content pro-
viders have very limited redress mechanisms at their disposal.299 
Without a doubt, the amount of bogus takedown notices that are being sent is a substantial prob-
lem with notice-and-takedown schemes. The technological development is most likely only go-
ing to boost the presence of automated algorithmic systems. On the upside, algorithms will 
surely improve over time on recognizing infringing content correctly and thus lowering the rate 
of dubious takedown requests. In the meantime, legislators ought to ensure that content provid-
ers have access to effective redress mechanisms such as a well-functioning counter-notice sys-
tem. A fast, balanced redress procedure can mitigate any damage done to the freedom of ex-
pression. Even if the content is found infringing in the end, the right to a fair trial demands that 
the uploader should be given an adequate opportunity to challenge the takedown notice.300 
While the DMCA offers content providers the opportunity to file counter-notices and rebut un-
founded takedown requests, the mechanism is utilized relatively rarely.301 The reason for such 
low utilization, is that content providers have to state, under penalty of perjury, that they have a 
good faith belief that the material was removed or disabled as a result of a mistake or misiden-
tification.302 Such imbalance in risk for the rightsholder and the content provider is problematic. 
It is problematic that the sender of a takedown notice faces so little liability while content pro-
viders may, in fear of liability, not appeal takedown requests even when they know they are 
right. Pursuant to the Finnish implementation of the ECD, the takedown notice must state the 
reason for removal of the content and provide information on the right to appeal in a court.303 
Informing the content provider of the charges brings an element of the right to a fair hearing 
into the process. Curiously, also Article 17(9) DSMD provides that rightsholders “shall duly 
justify the reasons” for their takedown requests. Article 17(9) DSMD indicates that perhaps the 
less harmonized solution of the ECD was not enough to ensure the rights of content providers. 
While Article 17(4)(c) DSMD is the only out of the four statutes analyzed that contains an ex-
plicit notice-and-stay down policy, it is actually not the first one to enable such a policy. CJEU’s 
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landmark decision Glawischnig-Piesczek from 2018, introduced a notice-and-stay down mech-
anism in the EU, which obligates online intermediaries to block content that is identical or sim-
ilar to the infringing content. The logic of a notice-and-stay down policy is however nothing 
new. The similar logic was applied decades earlier in Spence v. Flynt on the other side of the 
Atlantic Ocean. After Park Place had been sued once earlier for distributing defamatory content, 
they could no longer claim to not know about the nature of said content. The first lawsuit essen-
tially served as a rudimentary notice-and-stay down request way ahead of its time. Evidently, it 
was not called by that name, but the logic was largely the same. Notice-and-stay down does not 
come without its problems. The policy effectively leads to a monitoring obligation for the ser-
vice provider, which in itself is problematic on multiple levels.304  
Imperfect as the notice-and-takedown and stay down mechanisms are, they embed a fundamen-
tal safeguard for freedom of information as long as they force intermediaries to actually consider 
the infringing nature of the content before deciding whether to take action.305 In the end, the 
notice-and-takedown procedure is one of the essential mechanisms through which a balance 
between the interests of rightholders, online intermediaries and users is achieved.306 That is, 
unless legislators decide to go for the Section 230 approach which affords online intermediaries 
full protection from liability for user generated content. 
4.3 Content Filtering and Blocking  
Content filtering and blocking is a continuation to the notice-and-stay down discussion and a 
partly overlapping subject. None of the safe harbor policies include an explicit general obliga-
tion to monitor content, but the legislation in the EU requires service providers to block content 
identical or similar to previously blocked content, as was explained in the previous chapter. 
Remarkably, both Article 15 ECD and Article 17(8) DSMD explicitly state that the safe harbor 
provisions shall not lead to any general monitoring obligation. Still, it may be argued that the 
notice-and-stay down procedure in fact culminates in a comprehensive filtering obligation. This 
corresponds with the filtering measures which are forbidden by the aforementioned provisions 
 
304 See Kuczerawy 2020 p. 538; Elliot Harmon, ‘“Notice-and-Stay-Down” Is Really “Filter-Everything”’ (EFF, 21 
January 2016). Retrieved April 2, 2021, from https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2016/01/notice-and-stay-down-really-
filter-everything  
305 Geiger et al. 2020, p. 145. 
306 Van Eecke 2011, p. 1479–1480. 
66 
 
and that the CJEU has prohibited in Sabam v. Netlog.307 The functionality of the technical side 
of blocking certain content without screening all content is outside the scope of this research but 
it is worth noting. Despite proactive general monitoring not being explicitly imposed by law, 
online service providers have begun to voluntarily implement content filtering systems as a 
means of protecting themselves from lawsuits with regards to user generated content.308 A per-
fect example of this is Google’s previously mentioned Content ID.  
There is a global trend supported by legislators, courts, rightsholders and even online service 
providers that inclines towards the imposition of proactive monitoring and filtering obligations 
on online service providers.309 However, not everyone is in favor of the trend as it is a cause of 
valid concern. An ex-ante procedure based on filtering and automatic infringement-assessment 
systems that online service providers might deploy to monitor content, might disproportionally 
favor property rights against other fundamental rights, namely freedom of expression.310 An ex-
ante procedure that filters all user generated content before it is uploaded is essentially a form 
of censorship. To put it into perspective, such conduct would be in direct conflict with the U.S. 
Supreme Court’s Farmers Union v. WDAY decision from 1959 in which the Court held that 
filtering content was censorship and that it would violate the First Amendment. Nevertheless, 
to this day, the U.S. legislation does offer intermediaries broader protection from liability. An-
other concern pertains to the present level of technological sophistication.  
Much like the automated algorithmic systems send a lot of unjustified takedown notices, they 
also generate an abundance of false positives when filtering content, leading to overblocking 
and jeopardizing the fundamental right to freedom of expression.311 A common reason for false 
positives is that an algorithmic system has difficulties recognizing when the use of copyrighted 
content falls under fair use.312 Manual assessment would be desirable, especially when dealing 
with fair use. To require humans to assess content that falls under fair use is a tricky proposition 
as well. The financial burden of online service providers should not become disproportionate 
either.313 A possible solution would be to let content creators label content as fair use which the 
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service provider would then manually review. The obvious flaw with such a system is that it 
could be easily abused by users in the hopes of bypassing the automated filter and getting in-
fringing content published. Whatever the solution to false positives may be, the situation must 
improve.  
The future of content filtering does not appear trouble-free. Emerging technology and trends 
consistently challenge the filtering procedures. For example, live streaming is currently wildly 
popular, and it poses new challenges to content filtering systems.314 Everything happens in real 
time, so there is no way to review the content in advance. Perhaps, this is an aspect that the 
algorithmic systems may be able to address in the future when they become more advanced. If 
the problems pertaining to censorship and freedom of speech cannot be soon solved, maybe it 
is time to look for other alternatives. For example, a detect and notify procedure could be a 
better approach than detect and block from a freedom of expression point of view.315 The Sec-
tion 230 model with broader protection ought to be also considered in the EU to ensure that the 
fundamental rights are respected.  
4.4 Liability for User-Generated Content 
Doctrines of intermediary liability can be best explained by intermediaries’ assumption of re-
sponsibility for primary wrongdoers.316 The doctrines have been based on different theories 
ranging from moral to utilitarian approaches.317 The intermediaries are oftentimes much easier 
to identify, contact, and hold accountable than the users of their services. Arguably, online ser-
vice providers are also able to intervene in infringing behavior on their service making it con-
venient to impose liability on them instead of only the users. For rightsholders, it is usually futile 
trying to track down users and seek redress from them.318  
Of the four statutes analyzed, it is only Section 230 that provides a completely unique solution 
to the intermediary liability question. Section 230 provides online service providers full immun-
ity from liability for third-party infringements with a few exceptions, namely concerning 
 
314 Common 2019, p. 6. 
315 Garstka 2019, p. 9–10. 
316 Curto 2020, p. 88. 
317 Frosio 2017a, p. 25. 
318 Geiger et al. 2020, p. 75. 
68 
 
intellectual property and sex trafficking.319 The DMCA, the ECD, and the DSMD all encompass 
compromises between liability and no intermediary liability for third-party infringements. 
Online service providers are exempt from liability only if they conform to certain conditions set 
by the safe harbor provisions. All three statutes have slightly different conditions, but the logic 
remains the same. The conditions and their intricate elements are important, but only if such 
conditions exist at all. As was demonstrated in the previous chapters, mechanisms such as no-
tice-and-takedown or content filtering are only relevant if the safe harbor procedure imposes 
conditions, meaning that they are not even considerations in the context of Section 230. At the 
end of the day, the greater question encompassing all four statutes is whether the safe harbors 
should exist at all. 
Perhaps the most prominent argument against the safe harbors is the alleged “value gap”. Value 
gap refers to an alleged mismatch between the value that online service providers are perceived 
as obtaining from protected content and the revenue returned to relevant rightsholders.320 Ac-
cording to the theory, rightsholders are forced to accept low royalty rates because online inter-
mediaries can otherwise simply turn down license deals and exploit the protection provided by 
the safe harbors.321 Youtube is a prime example of a service that allegedly unfairly favors the 
platform over the rightsholders. “When we negotiate with YouTube, they can practically name 
their own price. If we refuse their offer, they might choose to pay nothing at all, pointing to the 
so-called ‘Safe Harbour’ exemption. But the Safe Harbour rule is completely obsolete and out 
of date with our present situation”, said Anders Lassen, the former CEO of the Danish collecting 
society KODA.322 The statement sums up well the sentiment of a lot of rightsholders—online 
service providers abuse the safe harbors to implement an “act first, license later” approach, co-
ercing rightsholders to agree to unfair terms on a take-it-or-leave-it basis.  
Allegedly, the imbalance in power exists due to online service providers being immune to lia-
bility and therefore having insufficient incentives to enter into ex-ante licensing agreements with 
rightsholders.323 One study suggests that the DMCA’s safe harbor provisions cost the U.S. music 
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industry up to one billion dollars a year in lost royalties.324 Additionally, rightsholders claim 
that safe harbors put an enormous burden on them to enforce their rights, forcing them to con-
stantly monitor online content for infringements.325 The claim is difficult to approve in light of 
the increasing demands on online service providers to filter user uploaded content. Sure, 
rightsholders must protect their rights, but it is an inherent feature of being a rightsholder and 
not a consequence of the safe harbor regulation. Nonetheless, there appears to be some validity 
to the “value gap” argument. Rightsholders are encountering new challenges pertaining to their 
monetization structures because the way content is consumed is changing. With the soaring 
popularity of paid services such as Spotify and Netflix, there is light in the end of the tunnel for 
rightsholders. Spotify and Netflix have been well known to spend considerable amounts of 
money on licensing deals with rightsholders. While the value gap arguably does exist, at least 
to some degree, the idea that it does exist due to safe harbors may be questioned. The value gap 
was not a problem in the early days of the safe harbors. Copyright protected content was still 
mostly being consumed offline. It is only when the consumption of such content moved to the 
Internet and rightsholders began making less money, that the value gap discussion started. 
Rightsholders need to be fairly compensated in healthy economy, it just should not be done at 
the expense of online service providers.  
With critics claiming for example that Section 230 privileges online publishers over their offline 
counterparts by giving online publishers more favorable legal protection,326 would it make sense 
to abolish the safe harbors and revert to how it was before them? There is little doubt that strict 
liability of online service providers would result in some of them withdrawing from the market 
or limiting the type and range of the services they provide.327 There is a direct economic rela-
tionship between regulatory burden and development. The more exposed online service provid-
ers are to liability, the less likely they are to invest in the development of electronic commerce.328 
Abolishing safe harbors would essentially lead to mandatory filtering, which without a doubt 
would burden smaller platforms and new entrants to the market.329 One way to counter the prob-
lem could be to implement something like Article 17(6) DSMD that exempts new and small 
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online service providers from liability. Regardless of the countermeasures, it is hard to imagine 
that a strict liability for online service providers would lead to anything else than concentration 
of power to the market leaders. The larger the company is, the more resources it has to conform 
to new regulation. The leading platforms have the resources to implement monitoring systems 
and procedures, whereas smaller platforms might not.330 Abolishing the safe harbors could fur-
ther encourage online service providers to generate their own content in order to obtain the 
rights, either by backing user-generated content or by producing it themselves.331 For example 
Netflix has already undertaken this for years, assumingly to cut back on the licensing fees. This 
procedure would more than likely become much more beneficial and common. Again, the lead-
ing platforms would undoubtedly be able to adapt to such change much more easily than smaller 
platforms. What exactly the concentration of power to a few leading platforms would mean for 
the consumers, is hard to tell. From a competition point of view, it would more than likely be a 
negative change.  
Where will the intermediary liability regulation go in the future? The recent regulation in the 
EU seems to suggest that the safe harbors will not be abolished, at least in the near future. The 
DSMD, which has not even been fully implemented, is largely in line with the with the ECD. 
The DSMD actually brings yet another safe harbor to the EU law. The new Directive neither 
abolishes safe harbors nor affords online service providers complete insulation from liability, it 
is merely a marginally updated version of the old safe harbors. The legislators in the EU have 
intentions of further updating the safe harbor regulation. The European Commission has drafted 
a proposal for the Digital Services Act.332 At this stage, it is too early to tell if the proposal 
passes and what it would look like in its final form. On the face of it, it does not seem to propose 
any radical changes to how intermediary liability works in the EU. Much like the DSMD, it will 
most likely be a mere update to the existing regulation, if it passes. The changes would concern 
the notice-and-takedown scheme and other features of the safe harbor procedure rather than 
being a complete overhaul of intermediary liability. In the U.S., there is nothing as substantial 
on the horizon. There have been calls from various groups to revamp the legislation, but nothing 
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tangible has yet been drafted. Perhaps the legislative efforts in the EU will inspire the U.S. to 




The question of whether intermediary liability safe harbors should exist or not boils down to 
which fundamental rights the legislators want to emphasize and protect. The involved parties 
can be divided into four main groups: intermediaries, users, rightsholders, and governments. 
Each group has their own set of interests and rights. For example, the freedom to conduct busi-
ness is an integral fundamental right for intermediaries, whereas the freedom of expression is 
crucial for the users. Rightsholders want to be fairly remunerated, and governments have a com-
plex responsibility of balancing economics and politics. Governments must respect the funda-
mental rights while making political decisions that stimulate the economy.  
The reason why intermediaries were isolated from liability in the first place can be attributed 
largely to the freedom of speech. The U.S. Supreme Court believed that imposing liability on 
intermediaries for third-party content would result in censorship from intermediaries which 
would consequently stifle free speech. With the rapid increase of online intermediaries in the 
1990s, it became apparent that the old policies needed to be adjusted. The reason being that the 
old policy incentivized intermediaries to adopt a hands-off approach to content moderation. The 
entire idea of the broad protection afforded by Section 230 is to allow intermediaries to moderate 
content in order to improve the user experience. Legislators wanted to incentivize intermediaries 
to create a safe and clean environment without illegal content. Copyright infringement was ex-
cluded from Section 230 for political reasons and instead it was included in the DMCA which 
was enacted in 1998. The EU followed suit and essentially copied the DMCA a couple years 
later. The DMCA implemented a safe harbor policy which does not unconditionally exempt 
intermediaries from liability. For intermediaries to be insulated from liability, they must con-
form with certain conditions. The same procedure can be found in the EU legislation, only with 
slightly different conditions. 
There are three ways to go about changing how intermediary liability works. One option is to 
provide intermediaries complete insulation from liability, such as is done in Section 230. The 
second option is to introduce safe harbors that are conditional, such as the DMCA, the ECD, 
and the DSMD. In the case that conditional safe harbors already exist, the conditions can be 
adjusted. The third option is to introduce strict liability to intermediaries. Neither the U.S. nor 
the EU has yet tried employing this option. Since the intermediary liability conundrum involves 
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lots of competing rights and other interests, there is likely no solution that would satisfy every-
one. The only solution that can almost certainly be ruled out is imposing strict liability on inter-
mediaries. If intermediaries were liable for everything that was posted on their platforms, they 
would undoubtedly have to filter all content ex-ante. Such a solution would seriously violate the 
freedom of expression. The other two options are proven to work. Both have their advantages 
and disadvantages and at the end of the day, it is a political decision. From a legal point of view, 
both are possible.  
This study managed to answer the question of what the purpose of safe harbors is. Therefore, 
there is no apparent reason to conduct further investigation on the same subject. Instead, this 
study indicates that future research should be focused for example on safe harbor conditions and 
mechanisms such as notice-and-takedown and content filtering. Investigating the existing pro-
cedures and offering solutions to their problems would be useful as there are plenty of unan-
swered questions pertaining to them. Investigating what implications implementing a broader 
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